

POLICING PUBLIC DISORDER IN A  
CANADIAN COMMUNITY IN CRISIS

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Abstract

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For the past several years a debate has been occurring about reason for the reduction of crime in New York City under the leadership of Mayor Giuliani and Police Commissioner Bill Bratton. Some claim that the principles of Broken Windows Theory worked to reduce crime. Others claim that the reduction had little to do with Broken Windows Theory and more to do with increased police, aggressive patrol tactics and abuses of the public by police. This research was conducted into an initiative by the Vancouver Police to reassign sixty police officers to the Downtown Eastside. This initiative, Citywide Enforcement Team was put in place to reduce disorder in the DTES. This research study utilized observational methods combined with quantitative and qualitative analysis to conclude that the introduction of the CET into the DTES impacted positively on the level of disorder and crime in that community.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction .....	1
2. Academic Debates on Crime and Disorder .....	4
3. Citywide Enforcement Team and the Downtown Eastside .....	42
4. Research Methodology and Findings .....	60
5. Conclusions .....	88
6. Works Cited .....	108
7. Appendices .....	117

## LIST OF FIGURES

<i>Number</i>	<i>Page</i>
Table 1 Research Finding Quantitative	84

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## *Chapter 1*

### INTRODUCTION

Do police matter? Can policing have an impact on crime and disorder in a community? Most police officers certainly believe that their efforts have a worthwhile impact: why would one sacrifice so much for nothing? One could argue that community impact is not the chief motivator for all officers, and that some seek only such rewards as in other occupations: remuneration, holiday packages, sick time and a good pension — yet the bulk of police officers are willing to sacrifice hours away from family, odd working hours, and sometimes, ultimately, their lives, because they truly believe that they make a difference in the safety and security of a community.

When one considers the vast body of academic research on the police and their impact on crime and disorder, an unclear picture emerges. The question of whether police matter is very important. Police operating budgets consistently cost a large portion of the community's tax money: does policing give value for this money? Or

could it be better spent on other expenditures that might attack the root causes of crime?

This paper will examine if the police — in particular the Vancouver Police, working in partnership with the community — can make a difference to the level of disorder in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside (DTES). In chapter two we will consider relevant academic contributions to the question of police effectiveness, and in particular Rational Choice Theories, Situational Crime Prevention and Broken Windows Theory. Then in chapter three we will examine the current state of the DTES, including a discussion of its history, its current residents and the local police. Following in chapter four will be a description of the methodology that was used to conduct research on the impact of the Vancouver Police Citywide Enforcement Team (CET), along with its rationale. Finally in chapter five we will draw some conclusions as to why the police do matter. In addition in chapter five we will consider how this research has added to the current debate between Harcourt, who is dismissive of broken windows theory, and Kelling, who is a proponent of broken windows theory.

The research conducted in this paper is testing the Broken Windows hypothesis and in particular if the addition of foot patrol police officers into a neighborhood in crisis can have an impact on crime and disorder. This research is also testing the hypothesis of opportunity theorist in that do the police matter. Can police minimize the opportunity to commit crime? Specifically the theory of capable guardians and motivated rational offenders will be tested. With the introduction of the CET into the DTES and the creation of more capable caregivers into the area. Further do rational thinking criminals emerge and decide to change their pattern of offending or is the police presence simply going to increase arrests.

In order to conduct independent research five university students agreed to make field observations of the DTES prior to the implementation of the CET and then once again after sixty-three days of their operations. These students quantitative recording and their qualitative observations provides evidence that the implementation of the CET did have impact on the level of public disorder and crime in the area. Further the CET had considerable impact on the students perception of their personal safety in the area while conducting observations.

Additionally an analysis will be conducted of other sources of research conducted on the DTES while the CET was put in place. This will specifically include the independent research conducted by Pollara of the DTES and Vancouver residents perceptions of the DTES, and the crime analysis conducted by the CET Criminal Intelligence Section.

The paper will conclude that irrespective of the current debates between Harcourt and Kelling about the causes of the reduction for crime in New York City, the DTES did have a reduction in crime because of the CET. Moreover that this study has replicated that when police are introduced into an area, public disorder and crime will reduce. Further if one agrees with Harcourt position that in New York these reductions came about because of police excesses then in Vancouver the same result came about without any such excesses. These differences include less of a focus by CET on zero tolerance and arrests and more of focus on being a sheer presence and the threat of arrest or prosecution. These different approaches with similar results compels this author to reject Harcourt's theory that increased police surveillance coupled with aggressive stops and frisks was the true cause of the crime reduction in New York City. In Vancouver's DTES the police did not use aggressive stop and search practices as these are prohibited under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

People were checked, searched when the CET found them in a position that the CET could legally do these stops and searches. One must concede that there was the report conducted by Human Rights Watch, which claimed excesses by the CET however these have been found to be based on hearsay and lacking in fact. The officers assigned to CET are professionals who are well aware of the consequences of improper action on their part.

*Chapter Two- Academic Debates and Crime and Disorder*

When discussing the issue of police effectiveness, and how policing affects the level of disorder in a community, some important theories to consider include Situational Crime Prevention Theory, Rational Choice Theory, and Routine Activity Theory. These theories will be considered only briefly, as foundations for the primary theory being analyzed, Broken Windows Theory. I will examine Broken Windows Theory in greater detail because it follows the same vein as Situational Crime Prevention, and is directly credited with some police agencies' successes in dealing with public disorder and crime (G. Kelling & Coles, 1996:19). Situational Crime Prevention itself is a synthesis of many other theories (Brunet, 2002:70), the inclusion of any of which could enrich this discussion; however, given the breadth of this paper I must limit theoretical discussion to those theories that appear on point.

There are many different crimes, and academics have provided many different explanations as to why crimes occur. Any first-year criminology student becomes acutely aware of the frustration of

learning and accepting one theory of the causes of crime, only shortly thereafter to learn a new, conflicting, but equally compelling theory. Situational Crime theory is one of the theories that has emerged since the 1970's with a re-focus on the crimes rather than the offenders. Situational crime prevention theorists believe that the opportunity to commit crime and why that opportunity exists is as important if not more important than the root cause of why an offender commits the crime. For these 'opportunity theorists' the prevention of crime is about target hardening and reducing rewards, increasing risks and not focusing on the offender. Police officers assigned to surveillance teams can describe the process of watching known criminals for only a few moments and being able to determine the person being watched is either in "crime mode" or not. Countless times, criminals who are in "crime mode" make rational decisions about when and where to commit a crime. Even the most drug-addicted addict, in search of a source of money to buy drugs for a much-needed fix, make decisions about which cars to break into, where to break into the cars, and what to take from them. Further, "Criminological theory has long seemed irrelevant to those who have to deal with offenders in the real world. This irrelevance stems partly from attributing the causes of crime to

distant factors, such as child rearing practices, genetic makeup, and psychological or social processes” (Felson & Clarke, 1998:1).

As one examines the causes crime and disorder in the DTES of Vancouver, there are two routes of enquiry one can take. One is to consider that the causes of crime and disorder are associated to the root causes of criminality, such as poverty, drug addiction, child abuse, et cetera. The other avenue of discovery is to attempt to understand the cause of crime and disorder within the context of the DTES and to examine why the DTES provides more opportunity for crime and disorder than other areas of the city. The residents of the DTES may be very compassionate for the drug addicts in their community, yet notwithstanding this they also want the crime and disorder to end. If the police, government, and social service providers were to accept the principles of Situational Crime Prevention and Broken Windows Theory, the reduction in crime associated with such a focused effort could bring enough results that some current financial resources may be funneled off to support other valued ventures that attack root causes. For this reason, this paper will examine these “opportunity theories” as opposed to “root causes.”

The implementation of the CET is seen to be a crime and disorder prevention measure. The purpose of the redeploying officers to foot patrol in the DTES is to increase the presence of the police in the DTES. Using the rational choice theorist perspectives the Vancouver Police are attempting to increase the capable guardians in the area while maximizing the risk of drug traffickers and open-air drug users getting caught. Ultimately the thinking criminal from Surrey (a Vancouver suburb connected to downtown by rapid transit), who usually steals, pawns and uses in the DTES, will decide that the rational decision is to stay out in Surrey, where there are fewer police and consequently less likelihood of being arrested.

Let us now consider the various theories.

### **Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activity Theory**

Rooted in the classic theorists of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham is the belief that the human being is a rational actor. This means that the human being, in making decisions, does an end/means calculation in order to maximize pleasure and minimize pain (Keel,

1997:Web Page). Rational Choice Theory derives from the failure of rehabilitative technologies and the increase of crime during the 1970s and 1980s (Keel, 1997: Web Page). This work has since been built upon, and many academics believe that criminals conduct a cost-benefit analysis when selecting legal or illegal behaviours (Bill McCarthy, 2002:422).

Routine Activity Theory was first outlined by Felson and Cohen in 1979 and further developed by Felson and Eck in 1986. The theories central hypothesis is that, “the probability that a violation will occur at any specific time and place might be taken as a convergence of likely offenders and suitable targets in the absence of capable guardians” (Bottoms & Wiles, 1997:320).

Wang discusses both Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activity Theory in his study, "Bank Robberies by an Asian Gang" in a major Southern city of the United States:

Crime results from the decision making process in which a potential offender weighs the possible costs and benefits of committing a crime. The decision or choice to commit a crime will be made after evaluating available information with regard to the risk of being caught, possible punishment, and the need

for criminal gain. If the economic benefit is not worthwhile or the chance of getting caught is too great, the individual may decide not to commit the crime (Wang, 2002:557).

Wang concluded from his research that the presence of motivated offenders, combined with suitable targets and lack of capable guardians, resulted in armed robberies of banks.

In review, Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activity Theory contend that crime is linked to the social/environmental context in which it takes place. The theories focus on the offender, the victim and the caretakers. Such theories are useful for my examination of the DTES because part of my theory contends that the DTES has lacked capable caretakers in the police (private or public), and that the communities of Chinatown, Gastown and Strathcona provide ample and adequate targets for these motivated offenders. Further, the sheer number of free services provided to people in the DTES, the density of nearby pawnshops, and the prolific number of drug traffickers combine to make the DTES a very attractive place for motivated offenders — even those from other communities. This situation is also exacerbated by a SkyTrain Transit system, which despite recent improvements does

not have an adequate system in place to check fare beaters (DesChamps, Brantingham, & Brantingham, 1994:143).

Sergeant Tony Zannatta of the Vancouver Police described the DTES in one of the early pre-CET planning meetings as the “one-stop shop” for Lower Mainland criminals (Zannatta, 2003: personal interview). A cocaine addict can commit a residential break and enter in Surrey, steal 50 music CD’s, hop on the SkyTrain with his bag of loot, take the train for free to Vancouver, walk three blocks to the DTES, pawn the CD’s for ten dollars each, purchase drugs easily and use them openly on the street, stop and get a free meal if he so chooses, and then take a free SkyTrain back out to Surrey. The DTES has become for criminals the equivalent of the modern day shopping mall, with all the required amenities for a family’s weekly shopping expedition. The City of Vancouver — and in particular the Vancouver Police, by implementing the CET — must make this “one-stop shop” less attractive. Moreover, the history of the DTES, its lack of resources, a series of misguided political decisions, and the subculture of tolerance that exists in the DTES have encouraged people to participate in activities that in other areas of the city would result in formal sanctions from the police.

According to Taylor, Rational Choice Theory was first applied when Derek Cornish and Ron Clarke introduced it in 1986. In their book, *The Reasoning Criminal*, the authors state that the criminal commits a crime because the opportunity to do so presents itself (Taylor, 1997:293). The theory postulates that crime, and the choice to commit crime, are based on rational thought. Further, the Rational Choice theorist is less concerned with what causes the criminality of individuals or in large parts of neighborhoods, than with the specific opportunities and evaluations made by criminals in seeking to commit a crime (Taylor, 1997:294). The “root causes” of crime are not considered: just the mechanics of an individual criminal act. The value in this type of theory is its applicability for people tasked with reducing crime and disorder — that is, not to negate root causes of crime, but simply to reduce the ability of those who commit crime.

Rational Choice Theory has been used to explain many types of crime. We shall now consider two recent studies, which have parallel applications to the DTES. McCarthy and Hagan (2001) found in their study of homeless youth that, on average, youth who sold drugs made about 101 dollars per day compared to the average legal wage of 37

dollars. They concluded that some youth are making a rational choice to be involved in drug trafficking to earn more income than if they had legitimate employment (Bill McCarthy, 2002:428; B. McCarthy & Hagan, 2001)). “Similarly, Washington, DC drug sellers earned monthly incomes that were more than double the median amount earned in legal jobs” (Bill McCarthy, 2002; Reuter P, 1990). These studies show that, at least in the case of some drug traffickers, some individuals are making rational choices to earn more income than the average person by resorting to crime.

Several criticisms of Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activity Theory exist; I will provide two that are particularly recent and relevant to the DTES studies. First, in using Rational Choice Theory to examine the impact of the CET in the DTES, one must consider if drug-addicted people are in fact capable of rational thought. One study of people under the influence of alcohol concluded that Rational Choice Theory may be in fact unable to explain the behaviour of people under the influence of alcohol because they are unable to make rational choices (Exum, 2002:959).

Other critics claim that, “[W]hat is common to both the routine activities and the rational choice theories is an inattention, in both the theoretical and empirical literature, to the possibility that persons may differ with respect to their initial propensity to offend (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993)

### **Situational Crime Prevention**

Situational Crime Prevention is a theory which builds upon the concepts of Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activity Theory. It does not reject the root cause theories; however, it sets them aside to concentrate on minimizing crime by reducing the opportunity for offenders to commit crime. The theory is concerned not with why the offender commits the crime, but with *how* the offender commits the crime — and more importantly, with how to minimize the attractiveness of the particular target. In fact opportunity theorists believe,

[S]ince crime opportunities are a necessary condition for a crime to occur, this makes them causes in a strong sense of the word. At the same time, many people from uncaring or broken homes have never committed crimes, and many people from good families in comfortable circumstances have become active offenders (Felson & Clarke, 1998: 1).

Situational Crime Prevention has been used to examine many types of crime to provide policy makers, police, and the public with information to try to combat the problem. Situational Crime Prevention theorists believe that there are ten principles of crime opportunity theory. Let us consider each one, and provide some relevant examples to the debate.

*Opportunity plays a role in causing all crime.*

Studies have shown that the manner in which licensed premises are designed or operated can have an impact on pub violence. Ross Homel and Jeff Clark conducted a study of licensed premises in Sydney, Australia in the winter of 1991, and concluded that some, in their policies and the manner in which staff handled situations, created the opportunity for violence, while others did not. The offender received cues from the bar's own management as to what kinds of behaviour would be accepted. They recommended better trained bouncers, and bar staff who focused on responsible serving practices (Homel & Clark, 1994: 16).

Twenty-five percent of all licensed premises in the City of Vancouver are located in the DTES (Prox, 2003a: Appendix). Such a high density of liquor establishments alone would indicate, based on the Homel and Clark study, that even without the open drug markets the DTES may be susceptible to proportionately more public disorder than other areas of the city. The larger percentage of licensed premises provides for more opportunities for liquor establishments that run their business in ways that are conducive to violence and disorder.

*Crime opportunities are highly specific.*

Certain types of crime have certain types of offenders. Offenders who perform residential burglaries, for instance, may not necessarily commit commercial break and enters. Further, this distinction is crucial in our discussion of CET and the DTES, because the police categorize its drug traffickers in one of two ways: either as “For profit traffickers” or as “User traffickers”. The “For profit trafficker” does not use drugs, and is simply in the area with the intent to earn an income selling them. Crime reduction strategies for this type of offender will be different than for a “User trafficker,” who typically mingles deals, acts as a go-between, or actively sells narcotics but

expects remuneration only in kind. Once they have sold enough narcotics to fix their needs for the day, they will take their drugs and go use. The police must treat these two types of offenders differently. The user is motivated by a drug addiction, while the “For profit trafficker is motivated by money.

*Crime opportunities are concentrated in time and space.*

“Dramatic differences are found from one address to another, even in high crime areas. Crime shifts greatly by hour of the day and by day of the week, reflecting the opportunity to carry out crime” (Felson & Clarke, 1998: v). Once again the DTES has the same patterns. The highest call load for police is the few days after the social assistance checks are issued. There have been increases in robberies, drug overdoses and the area takes on a general “Mardi Gras” atmosphere.

*Crime opportunities depend on everyday movement of activity.*

“Offenders and their targets shift according to the trips to work, school, and leisure settings” (Felson & Clarke, 1998: 16). The DTES

because of its place in the history of Vancouver is a central area or hub of activity. Many of the transit routes that enter the city of Vancouver stop at Main and Hastings Street. This access to transit, combined with the proximity of Gastown and Chinatown and the central business area is such that many people come into the area for legitimate reasons. Some of these people become victims of crime, some are witnesses to the crime and disorder and in turn this impacts on the reputation of the area.

*One crime produces opportunities for another.*

This principle acknowledges that various types of crime have ancillary effects. For example, many sex trade workers find themselves victims of assault or — even worse — homicide. The type of crime in which they are already involved can potentially increase their risk of others. Further the opportunity that the DTES provides for crime and disorder is such that many times people who are accused people today are victims tomorrow. The presence of crime and bustling open-air drug markets provides the opportunity for other crimes. In the DTES it is common for there to be turf wars over corners

to sell drugs from, drug rip offs and violence associated with the illicit trade.

*Some products offer more tempting crime opportunities.*

Smaller items with a high resale value are at higher risk of theft than larger items. The rate of refrigerator theft from retail stores is significantly lower than that of compact disks. The DTES with its high number of pawnshops creates an environment where offenders can quickly receive financial gains from crime. The stealing and fencing of compact disks is so easy that some of the pawnshops have simply focused on this end of their business. The offender can be prepared to receive 5 to 10 dollars for each CD. A theft from auto where an offender steals CD's can quickly earn the offender 50 dollars from the pawning of the CD's. That money is quickly used to purchase drugs, and the cycle repeats itself over and over.

*Social and technological changes produce new crime opportunities.*

New technology provides the opportunity for more types of theft. For example, remote-controlled garage door openers were found to

create a security breach, when technology allowed criminals to facilitate theft by recording the infrared signal, and then playing it back later to open the garage. Relating this principle back to the DTES, prior to the Skytrain being put into place a criminal from Surrey or Burnaby would have a considerably longer amount of travel time in order to get to the DTES. The Skytrain now has decreased that travel time to 45 minutes from one end of the track at the King George Station to the DTES. This technological improvement has changed the mobility for criminals in the lower mainland and has made the DTES more accessible to more people.

*Reducing opportunities can prevent crime.*

The CET is about placing more officers on the streets in the DTES in order to reduce the opportunity for offender to commit crimes. The presence of a police officer in the block can have the impact that crime does not occur in that block. Prior to CET the use of drugs and the selling of drugs on the street was quite open, in fact often dealers would make these deals in front of police cars waiting at the light, the dealers recognized that the officers were likely assigned to higher priority calls and would not stop to arrest them. The dealers also

recognize that officers on foot are more often available to deal with such issues and arrest is a very real potential consequence.

Many studies have evaluated changes, which resulted in successful reduction through the use of Situational Crime Prevention. In one example, the West German government decided in 1963 to make steering locks mandatory on all new and used vehicles. This change in law made vehicles more difficult to steal, and vehicle theft correspondingly dropped by more than 60% (Clarke, ; Mathew, Clarke, Sturman, & Hough, 1976) in (Clarke, 1980).

In a study conducted in England and Wales, researchers analyzed the relationship between car theft and the absence or presence of a physical security device, in order to determine whether a barrier to opportunity changed the pattern of crime. Their comparison of the year 1969 to 1973 found a drastic reduction in vehicle theft once steering locks were introduced. This study shows that through target hardening, crime can be prevented.

A more recent study of street prostitution, a long-term social problem which many people have written off as unsolvable, found that

in London, England, police and other community agencies could in fact combat street prostitution by working together. One initiative was to close off streets to decrease the ease of kerb crawlers in finding suitable women from whom to solicit sex (Mathews, 1993).

*Reducing opportunities does not usually displace crime.*

The proposition that attacking the opportunity for crime in one area simply displaces it to another area has been found lacking in substance. Some displacement may occur, but generally not full displacement. Displacement is said to occur in one of five ways:

1. Geographical Displacement: crime can be moved from one location to another.
2. Temporal Displacement: Crime can be moved from one time to another.
3. Target Displacement: Crime can be directed away from one target to another.
4. Tactical Displacement: One method of committing the crime can be substituted for another.
5. Crime Type Displacement: One kind of crime can be substituted for another (Felson & Clarke, 1998:25).

Displacement is not inevitable. Three different reviews of displacement have occurred in Canada, the United States and the Netherlands and found that displacement occurs much less frequently or fully than was previously believed (Felson & Clarke, 1998:28). In fact the Dutch Ministry of Justice found that in their study of situational crime prevention that in 22 of the 55 cases studied no displacement occurred. Further in the remaining 33 studies of which displacement was found, only some of the crime seemed to be displaced. Key to the discussion is that in no case was the amount of crime displaced equal to the crime prevented (Felson & Clarke, 1998:28). In other words there was always some drop off of crime.

In considering some of the examples it can be seen that creative crime prevention techniques have resulted in decreases in crime with minimal or no associated displacement. Let consider some of the cases:

- Sweden: New identification procedures greatly reduced check fraud
- Australia: Target hardening in banks reduced bank robbery with no increase in other types of robberies.

- West Midlands: Increase in lighting on one estate did not displace crime to other estate.
- Dover: Increased security in car park did not displace to other local car parks (Felson & Clarke, 1998:27).

The DTES and CET will be discussed in the final chapter relating to displacement.

*Focused opportunity reduction can produce wider declines in crime.*

When a community perceives that crime prevention tactics have been increased, or broadened in influence, diffusion of benefits can occur. The CET in its initial deployment is focusing on the DTES, however, by its name the unit is a city wide task force. Citywide implies that the CET could be deployed in other areas of the city to deal with current or new emerging problems. The creation of this unit alone could potentially have a diffusion of benefits for the citizens of Vancouver. The diffusion of benefits concept is that when a crime prevention technique is put into place, often the offenders are unsure of exactly where these prevention methods have been placed. Therefore the offenders often assume that the crime prevention technique has a

wider sphere of control that it actually does. There are many examples of this including, CCTV installed in car parks, vandalism on school busses, library books, and vehicle tracking systems (Felson & Clarke, 1998:30).

Now that we have considered the contributions of Rational Choice theorists, Routine Activity theorists and Situational Crime Prevention theorists, we will turn to the focus of our discussion, Broken Windows Theory.

### **Broken Windows Theory**

Kelling and Wilson's Broken Windows Theory is based on the work by Dr. Philip Zimbardo. In 1969, Zimbardo, placed two similar cars into neighborhoods and then left both vehicles unattended. One of the cars was left in the Bronx and the other in Palo Alto, California. The car in the Bronx was left without license plates and the hood up, within ten minutes the vehicle was vandalized. The vehicle in Palo Alto survived for over a week untouched. Zimbardo then decided to smash the car with a sledgehammer; within a few hours it too was the victim of vandalism (J. Q. Wilson & Kelling, 1982: 5).

Broken Windows Theory, first espoused by Dr. George Kelling and James Wilson in an article in the *Atlantic Monthly*, is one of the most controversial criminology theories of contemporary times. Its hypothesis is that if social and physical disorder in a community is not addressed, more serious forms of disorder and eventually increased levels of crime will follow (J. Q. Wilson & Kelling, 1982:5). In their analogy of the broken window, where a window is broken people will begin to believe that no one cares for the property, and eventually more windows will be broken. I will describe the DTES in greater detail in chapter 3, but its prolific, blatant, street-level drug trafficking and drug use leaves the distinct impression that no one cares. This creates an environment where criminality is the norm and order is simply a concept for other neighborhoods.

This theory is of particular importance to our discussion because the work of Dr. Wilson, Skogan and Keeling combined with its application by Mr. Bill Bratton has been of keen interest to many police officers and managers. The turnaround that New York City saw in the mid 1990's changed the face of policing in North America. The results that Bill Bratton produced convinced many that the police could make a difference. While Bratton was the police commissioner from 1994 to

1996, subway crime fell by 80%, serious crime went down by 60% and the murder rate dropped by 70% (Ballard, :1). Bratton recognized the influence that Broken Windows Theory had on his direction in the document, Police Strategy Number 5: Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York. In the policy paper Bratton outlined that he believed that disorder and crime were related and that the police would need to focus on quality of life issues if they were to be successful in fighting crime (Bratton & Giuliani, 1994:6). This theory is also the basis of the CET project. Academic research would suggest that Situational Crime Prevention, Rational Choice and Routine Activity Theory are at least as applicable to the DTES as Broken Windows Theory, if not more so — however, the practical successes of Broken Windows Theory render it the more compelling theory for police managers, looking to resolve disorder and crime problems on their beat.

In one of the first studies conducted to test Broken Windows Theory, Skogan surveyed 13 000 people from forty urban residential neighborhoods in Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, Newark and San Francisco, asking them about their experiences with crime — their fears, their actions, and what they believed regarding neighborhood disorder. Skogan's field researchers also observed instances of public

disorder in ten neighborhoods (G. Kelling & Coles, 1996: 24). In the study he found that most people agreed on a definition of disorder in that the bulk of the people found disorder to be in one of two categories, social disorder and physical disorder (Skogan, 1990:2). Social disorder was public drinking, public drug use, street harassment, corner gangs, noisy neighbors and street prostitution (Skogan, 1990:32). Further, physical disorder included vandalism, dilapidation and abandonment and rubbish (Skogan, 1990:43).

One key finding was that in “neighborhoods with higher crime levels, disorder was linked more strongly with crime than were other characteristics of the area — poverty, instability in the housing market, and predominantly minority racial composition amongst residents”(G. Kelling & Coles, 1996 :25). This study and these particular findings have provided much empirical support for police strategies which tackle crime through the eradication of disorder (Katz, Webb, & Schaefer, 2001:2).

Skogan's study has received much criticism from Harcourt (1998) and from Eck and Maguire (2000). Harcourt claims that there is no empirical validity to the link Skogan claims to have made between

crime and disorder (Harcourt, 2001:60), and further criticizes Broken Windows Theory by claiming that cracking down on disorder in fact perpetuates crime by creating a new class of deviants (Rimensnyder, 2001: 3). In addition, Harcourt cites two primary reasons against the theory: that crime has also decreased in cities that do not apply Broken Windows Theory; and that its identification of “losers” who attract police attention has been accompanied by a 60% increase in complaints of police misconduct (Rimensnyder, 2001: 4).

Harcourt specifically criticizes Skogan's data, claiming that they were patched together from five separate studies which were not entirely consistent, and that as a result his study is missing a large amount of information. Statistics on robbery victimization are available in only thirty neighbourhoods, and information on disorder is missing on average thirty to forty percent of the time (Harcourt, 2001:60). Moreover, Harcourt refutes Skogan's claim of a relation between robbery and disorder, noting that even in Skogan's own study, no relationship was found between disorder and burglary, rape, physical assault, or purse snatching (Harcourt, 2001:60).

Eck and Maguire concluded, after examining Skogan's work, that the results do not provide a sound basis for social policy (Katz et al., 2001). Skogan's failure to use a cross-sectional methodology has also been criticized. "Taylor argued that to adequately test Wilson and Kelling's 'broken windows' hypothesis, which is longitudinal, researchers must use a longitudinal design and examine a large number of communities" (Katz et al., 2001 : 3).

Other critics have suggested alternate reasons for the decline in New York's crime rate, which are unrelated to Broken Windows Theory. One such claim is that the reduction occurred because of a change in drug use (Bowling, 1999:13):

Among the most convincing explanations for the rise and fall of New York murder in the last decades of this century is the simultaneous rise and fall of crack cocaine. This changing social context, together with the combined effect of preventative work among local communities and a rejection of crack cocaine and guns by a new generation of young people provides a credible alternative account to that generated by media smart police (Bowling, 1999:13).

Further critics have associated the decline in crime with changes to police practices regarding street dealing and gun offenses (Johnson, Golup, & Dunlap, 2000) in (G. L. Kelling & Sousa, 2001:3).

They claim that the decline is due not to the application of Broken Windows Theory, but to police targeting of high-risk offenders.

Critics have also credited the increased legitimacy of social institutions such as family and education with the decline of crime in New York City (LaFree, 1998) in (G. L. Kelling & Sousa, 2001:3). These theorists reject both Broken Windows Theory and other police efforts, claiming instead that the true reason for the reduction is the change in family practices.

Still other critics point to a similar decline in crime rates within other American cities, which have not adopted practices associated with Broken Windows Theory. “San Francisco in fact adopted less strident law enforcement policies that reduced arrests, prosecutions, and incarceration rates” (Jamison, 2002:1). The San Francisco area saw a reduction in violent crime by 47% between 1992 and 1998 — more even than New York City's reduction of 46%. In addition, San Francisco decreased its incarceration rate from 2136 individuals in 1993 to 703 individuals in 1998 (Jamison, 2002:6).

Similar decreases were also found in other cities that had not incorporated Broken Windows Theory. Marshall points out that the cities of Chicago, San Diego, Washington D.C. and Los Angeles also reported drops in crime without instituting Broken Windows Theory. These agencies instead adopted the less “coercive” methods of community policing (Marshall, 1999:4). The interesting thing about this is that community policing and Broken Windows policing are very similar. Community policing done correctly ensures that the community and the police working in partnership define priorities for the policing of the community. It has become apparent that as these relationships flourish that order maintenance and quality of life issues are of high importance to citizens. This focus is consistent with Broken Windows Theory. In addition when a police agency becomes less concerned with traditional 911-response policing, and switches to a mode that is more responsive to the community's quality of life, it is not practicing Broken Windows Theory is incorrect. The police agency which uses proactive intelligence to clean up problem premises is in fact fixing the broken windows of the area.

Several studies have been completed, however, which support the theory that order maintenance will bring about reduction in crime.

While attending a 1982 conference at the Harvard Executive Session, Dr. Kelling first delivered his paper on Broken Windows. A police officer named Bill Bratton heard the academic, and believed that some of the concepts Kelling spoke of were consistent with Bratton's own experiences. Interestingly, it was not until Bratton became Chief of Police for the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) in May 1983 that he got to put some of these concepts to work. According to Bratton's book *Turnaround*, his first course of action as Chief of Police was to eradicate the disorder within the ranks of the police officers. The professional standards that he set and enforced quickly turned an organization with serious issues into a professional crime-fighting department. Commenting on this, Bratton states, "[Y]ou can't overstate the effect of the chief of police showing up in a subway station. Symbolically, it means that every station is going to be policed, and every station is going to be policed correctly" (Bratton & Knobler, 1998: 123). Bratton's leadership and commitment to reducing crime through disorder eradication or minimization resulted in a drop of 27% of all crime on the MBTA (Bratton & Knobler, 1998:127).

The Broken Windows Theory is born from Situational Crime Prevention, Routine Activity Theory and Rational Choice Theory.

Broken Windows Theory believes that people will make rational choices about neighborhoods in which to commit crime, based on the level of commitment to public safety in these communities. In addition, Broken Windows theory simply believes that by attacking order maintenance issues the community will feel safer and that crime will decline.

This belief that proactive police tactics work has been borne out in several academic studies. One United States study concluded that the rate of traffic violation tickets issued by a police department was inversely related to the number of robberies in that city. Wilson and Boland studied aggressive policing and crime in 35 large cities and concluded that aggressive patrol strategies deter robberies (Wilson and Boland, 1978) in (Katz et al., 2001:3). Their study was later replicated with a larger sample and slightly altered methodology by Sampson and Cohen, who researched the relationship between traffic tickets issued and disorderly conduct arrests per officer, and also concluded that aggressive policing resulted in lower robbery rates (Katz et al., 2001:3).

Weiss and Freels, however, conducted a similar study in Dayton, Ohio, with results that criticized Wilson and Boland. Breaking

the police into two areas, one the control area and the other the experiment area, they asked the officers in the experiment area to pursue and ticket traffic violators aggressively. The officers in the experimental group made three times as many stops as in the control group, and showed an increased number of arrests for driving under the influence, and for possession of drugs and weapons. Yet there was no direct drop in index crimes (Katz et al., 2001: 3). These conclusions are troubling because the seizure of drugs and weapons, and the stopping of drunk drivers, are of themselves examples of crime reduction. Therefore could it still not be said that aggressive, proactive policing reduces crime?

Following the research of Sherman, many police departments have directed resources at specific neighborhoods in an effort to curb crime and disorder at particular locations. Though there are several studies of these initiatives, the scope of this paper does not allow for significant examination here. However, one study that particularly merits mention is known as the "hot spots" policing study. "The Crime Control Institute and Rutgers University identified 110 hot spots and then randomly selected 55 of these spots to receive more aggressive policing. Using calls for service and observational data, researchers

reported that calls for service for crime decreased by 6% to 13% and that disorder decreased by 50% in the targeted areas, in comparison to the control areas” (Katz et al., 2001: 4). This study shows that police officers working in a proactive, targeted fashion can make positive changes and improve community safety.

When we turn to police initiatives targeted at disorder instead of crime, as mentioned before, we find some additional results. Sherman (1990) investigated the effects of disorder policing on serious crime. Examining a Washington D.C. order-maintenance crackdown on public drinking and parking violations, and its impact on robberies, Sherman found that the crackdown had a positive effect on people's perception of safety in the area, but not on the actual number of robberies (Katz et al., 2001:4).

Novak et al (1999) examined the enforcement of liquor laws versus the rate of robbery and burglary. The aggressive enforcement strategy in this study took place over a 30-day period in an experimental area. The authors concluded that the intervention did not have a significant effect on the rates of robbery or burglary, although

they do admit that this could be due to the brevity of the study (Novak, Hartman, Holsinger, & Turner, 1999) in (Katz et al., 2001:5).

Katz criticizes both these studies because they looked at reducing order simply by reducing alcohol-related crimes. Katz refers to this as fixing every tenth broken window — the purpose of Broken Windows Theory being to fix every broken window, so that people have a sense that the community is cared for and that antisocial behavior will not be accepted.

Kelling and Coles reported, in their study of the New York City Transit subway system, that with a clean-up of graffiti, interaction with disorderly people, and moving along of homeless people, there was a significant reduction in serious crime (G. Kelling & Coles, 1996: 109). They found that the people committing minor crimes, such as fare beating, were also those involved in more serious crime. For example, “in certain neighborhoods, as many as one arrestee in ten was either wanted on a felony charge or carrying an illegal weapon (G. Kelling & Coles, 1996: 134). Furthermore, after order maintenance and Broken Windows Theories were implemented into operational policing

strategies, felonies on New York subways declined by 75%, and specifically robberies declined by 64% (G. Kelling & Coles, 1996: 152).

The Jersey Police Department also initiated a strategy to deal with crime through reducing disorder. The department's Violent Crime Unit was tasked to find the most common violent crime locations in their city. Once these were determined, Problem Oriented Policing Projects were created to address disorder in these problem locations. Research findings suggest that the Jersey Police Department was effective in reducing disorder, and more importantly that both crime incidents and calls for police service were reduced (Braga et al., 1999) in (Katz et al., 2001: 6).

In Chandler, Arizona, the Broken Windows thesis was further scrutinized in an examination of the Chandler Police Department's quality of life initiative, "Operation Restoration". This project combined a police resource team with a city licensing and permit team, which was tasked with ensuring that homeowners in the affected areas were diligent in repairing or maintaining their homes. These efforts combined with intensive police order maintenance and proactive enforcement policies to minimize public disorder. The study showed a

decrease in morality-related crime and disorder, but also showed no change if not an increase in overall calls for service related to crime. The researchers concluded that a Broken Windows police initiative can have a positive impact on some forms of crime, but not necessarily on other forms of crime. The authors did interview police officers who believed that the results may be skewed by an emerging gang crime problem in the tested area (Katz et al., 2001: 17).

Broken Windows Theory has also been practiced in Hartlepool, England, when under the leadership of Detective Chief Inspector Mallon, the Cleveland Constabulary began to implement Broken Windows Theory and the enforcement of nuisance-type crime. The crime rates for the Hartlepool area had doubled between 1980 and 1992, and more specifically, in the four months prior to DCI Mallon's taking over, the crime rate had risen by 38% (Dennis & Mallon, 1997) in (Marshall, 1999:6). Using Broken Windows Theory as a blueprint, Mallon encouraged his officers to consider quality of life issues, and to focus on the minor crimes as well as the larger crimes. The results, according to Mallon, were a total reduction in crime by 27%, and in particular reductions in vehicle theft by 56% and in domestic burglary by 31% (Dennis & Mallon, 1997) in (Marshall, 1999:7).

In December 2001, responding to some of the critics of the New York City police department's successes in reducing crime, Dr. Kelling and Dr. Sousa conducted an additional study of New York crime rates. They conducted field observations and considered crime reports to draw conclusions that, once again, showed a causal relationship between misdemeanor (less serious crimes) arrests and reduction in violent crime. After their examinations of various sources of information, Kelling and Sousa state that when order maintenance increases, violent crime decreases (G. L. Kelling & Sousa, 2001:7). Responding to the criticism that the declines occurred because of a decrease in crack cocaine use, they concluded that neither the number of young males in a precinct, nor the number of borough cocaine episodes, are significantly related to that precinct's violent crime rate (G. L. Kelling & Sousa, 2001:9). Moreover, they also found that while unemployment bears a relationship to violent crime, it is not as one would predict: an increase in unemployment actually proved to be related to a decrease in violent crime (G. L. Kelling & Sousa, 2001:9). Most revealing, however, is their principal finding:

The number of precinct misdemeanor arrests is significantly related to precinct violent crime. In fact, this measure of “broken windows” policing is the strongest predictor of precinct violent crime in this model. The coefficient is negative (-0.036) which indicates an inverse relationship between our measure of “broken windows” and violent crime: as misdemeanor arrests increase, violent crime decreases. Stated more specifically, the coefficient of -.036 means that on average, for every misdemeanor arrest in a given precinct, there were .036 fewer violent crimes committed (G. L. Kelling & Sousa, 2001:9).

Based on this 2001 research, the authors concluded that, “contrary to 'root cause' advocates, overall declines in violent crime cannot be attributed to economy, drug use, or demographics” (G. L. Kelling & Sousa, 2001:9). Instead such reduction is the result of police efforts.

Though not an exhaustive literature review, my touching-down approach has addressed, albeit briefly, most of the leading commentators on the issue of causes of crime and disorder. The value of conducting this research on the CET and the DTES is that the principles of Broken Windows Theory, and whether the police do matter, have not been researched before in Canada. Canada has an entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which precludes Canadian police from engaging in some of the proactive police initiatives that occurred in New York, such as civil injunctions, nor in the stop-and-search powers enjoyed by United Kingdom officers. The

research completed here will open the door to further examination of police practices in Canada. As we have seen in the literature here reviewed, there are many points of view with equally compelling evidence. In presenting my research on the CET in the DTES, I hope simply to add to the debates, with of course a Canadian flair.



*Chapter Three - Citywide Enforcement Team and the  
Downtown Eastside*

The Downtown Eastside is one of the oldest neighborhoods in the City of Vancouver, British Columbia. Located in the southwest corner of Canada, the city is surrounded by water on three sides and has a population of 560 000 people. In addition, it is the hub of entertainment, business, and education for the larger Greater Vancouver Region, which has a population base of two million people. Vancouver is the largest city in British Columbia, and the third largest in Canada; with a bustling Port and a vibrant tourist industry, it is also considered Canada's gateway to Asia (*About Vancouver*, : Web Page). This chapter will spend some time describing the Downtown Eastside and outlining the history of the community, as well as describing its current policing operations.

Once the heart of the City of Vancouver — the main library and city hall, now the building is called the Carnegie Center, were once located on the corner of Hastings Street and Main Street — the Downtown Eastside is now tragically described as the poorest postal

code in Canada. Its problems with crime and substance misuse have been topics of national discussion (*Community History*, : Web Page).

In the late nineteenth century, the Downtown Eastside's several hotels, shops and service providers provided services to the men who came into town from the logging and mining camps. But in 1958 the streetcars quit running to the Downtown Eastside, and in the early 1960s the City of Vancouver permitted a large shopping complex called Pacific Centre to be built some distance to the west. The region began to feel the pains of less business, and housing prices began to decrease. This in turn provided an opportunity for lower income housing, and when psychiatric patients were de-institutionalized in the early 1970s, the era of "Community Care," the Downtown Eastside became a viable place for them to live. The combination of less viable business opportunities, lower transient populations, and more psychiatric patients in the area made the Downtown Eastside an attractive place for drug traffickers to build their customer base.

In the 1980s the drug of choice changed from heroin to cocaine, and with cocaine came an increase in violence. Cocaine's effects on people, contrasted with those of heroin, increased the neighborhood's

problems. Whereas heroin causes people to become drowsy while under the influence, cocaine can cause people to become violent and paranoid. Crime in the area produced the quasi-legitimate business of pawn shops, which purchase goods from people significantly below market cost, and then resell them for a higher cost, but still below market value. The presence of pawn shops makes it difficult for legitimate businesses to survive.

In 1992, Woodward's department stores — one of the largest and most well-established retailers in the city — went out of business, taking with it the flagship store on Hastings Street (*Community History*, :Web Page). The site of the store was in November 2002 taken over by poverty advocates who had to be removed by police.

The DTES in 1996 had a population of 16 825 people — about 2.9% of the city's total — on a land area of approximately 3.86 square kilometers, or 3.3% of the entire city. The proportion of DTES residents considered to be in the low-income bracket is about 68%. A total of 93% (4816) of its dwellings are rented, with 5179 homes designated single room occupancy. The criminal code offence rate in the area is 812 offences per 1000 people — quite high compared to the

rest of the city, whose rate is 116/1000. Further exacerbating the DTES' problems is that, despite its small size and population, it contains fully 25% of the liquor-licensed seats for the city, and over 26% of the total liquor licenses for the city (Prox, 2003a: Appendix).

The Downtown Eastside's issues are similar to those faced in many urban areas of the world. These include a high rate of drug addiction and dealing, HIV infection, prostitution, crime, lack of adequate housing, high unemployment, and the loss of many legitimate businesses (*Downtown Eastside Revitalization*, : Web Page).

In the DTES, these issues are very real. The City of Vancouver has averaged 147 overdoses per year on illicit drugs, with many occurring in the DTES (MacPherson, 2000:1). This overdose rate has prompted many different social service providers to set up shop in the DTES, to bring services to the people who need them the most. Unfortunately — and while I am not suggesting that these services are necessarily a bad thing, one must recognize the effects of such a concentration of service providers upon the issues of public disorder in the area — this has further exacerbated the “one-stop shop” for drug users and dealers. Not all users of these services live in the DTES;

many travel to the DTES to engage them. Nor do all of the drug users: one study has shown that 40 percent of individuals who misuse drugs in the DTES live outside of the area (*Vancouver Injection Drug Users Survey*, 2000) in (MacPherson, 2000:7). In addition to the influx of drug users, there is a high rate of disease amongst the area's residents: 30 percent of the DTES' drug addicts have HIV, and more than 90 percent have Hepatitis C (Thompson, 2003:3).

A recent unpublished research report by Constable Gerry Wickstead and criminology students Gareth Bradley and Jennifer Parks found interesting data regarding the drug users in the DTES. Over eight days in January 2003, they interviewed 100 people openly using drugs in the DTES — the participants volunteered to be interviewed and confidentiality was assured. They found that 94% of the addicts used heroin or cocaine daily; 67% spent more than 50 dollars per day on their habit; and 73% of the participants were over the age of thirty, with drug addictions that had lasted for well over a decade (Wickstead, Parks, & Bradley, 2003:4).

In reviewing the addicts' criminality, the research found that:

The money is easy to obtain and there is a small risk of being caught. In 2001 those responsible for 88% of reported crime in the City of Vancouver were never criminally charged. Let's face it, the chances of getting charged with a criminal offence in British Columbia and then going to jail is quite low. Each year the general public reports about 500,000 criminal incidents and in British Columbia we have a prison capacity of roughly 4,400 jail beds. Statistics Canada estimates the public really only reports about a third of actual crime that is out there. For every 100 adults charged with a criminal offence in this province 13 were sentenced to custody (Wickstead et al., 2003:5).

In considering the cost of purchasing drugs to support such a habit, the research notes that the DTES is reportedly the poorest neighborhood in Canada. Now, a piece of crack cocaine, or a small paper flap of powder cocaine, commonly sells for \$10 each, while small quantities of heroin can sell for either \$10 or \$20. It is estimated that the DTES has 4 times as many crack cocaine users as injection drug users on the streets; and cocaine users inject drugs more frequently than individuals using heroin. In 2001, Vancouver saw an average of 8 936 syringes distributed every day. If each syringe were only used once to inject an illicit drug, we could conservatively estimate the number of illicit drug doses to be 44 680 each day. Multiplied by \$10 a dose, this comes to \$446 800 spent every day, or \$16.3 million spent on illicit drugs in the area annually. This figure also does not account for the many user traffickers who receive their drugs for work in kind

arrangements. Moreover 67 of the 100 respondents admitted to spending at least \$50 a day on illicit drugs. This works out to \$1 500 per month — or twice what the average BC homeowner is paying on their mortgage. Additionally 47% of the respondents claimed to spend \$100 or more a day on illicit drugs, or \$36 500 in annual drug spending. An individual with a legitimate occupation, funding such a costly drug habit, would have to gross at least \$52 000 a year before tax — and this does not yet include paying for food, shelter, clothing, transportation, or other personal expenses. The user would have to earn the equivalent of \$27 an hour (Wickstead et al., 2003:5).

With regard to open drug use, and the associated public disorder that occurs when people use drugs on a city street, the research found:

78% of the respondents stated they used the drugs immediately, “right away”, after they purchased them on the street. 22% stated they waited over 30 minutes or longer after the purchase before they used drugs. 85% said they regularly used drugs outside in public view on the DTES streets and alleys whereas 15% said they waited until they were inside a building at their home or at a friend’s place (Wickstead et al., 2003:6).

The chance of being caught by the police and charged with a criminal offence is so negligible that drug addicts in the DTES do not even consider it when choosing to use drugs:

Almost all of the respondents echoed the opinion that the Downtown Eastside was an attractive place for people openly buying and using drugs because there was no fear of prosecution and cheap high quality drugs were easy to obtain. Reviewing Vancouver Police drug enforcement statistics it is easy to see why people do not fear being charged with drug possession.

For over a decade, people have rarely been charged with drug possession in Vancouver. In 1992 there were a total of 812 charges of either heroin or cocaine possession in Vancouver which averages out to 2.2 charges per day. At the same time the Vancouver Needle Exchange was distributing an average of 1,664 needles per day. In 2000 there were a total of 242 charges of either heroin or cocaine possession in Vancouver (less than 1 charge a day). During that same year an average of 9,454 needles was distributed in Vancouver each day (Wickstead et al., 2003:6).

The history of police enforcement actions in the DTES has not been well documented. It is fair to say that there has always been a stronger presence of foot patrol officers in the Downtown Eastside than in other areas of the city; however, this allotment of officers has not

always remained at the same strength. Sergeant Tony Zannatta recalls that earlier in his career, 16 officers would be assigned to walking posts in the DTES on any given night (Zannatta, 2003: personal interview). In the last few years that number has significantly decreased — and for a period in the late 1990s, the police even adopted a policy of containment, in which the removal of foot patrol teams to surrounding areas was meant to encourage people to use drugs only in the DTES (Knight, 2003:2).

The City of Vancouver has been proactive in trying to get a handle on the issues of public disorder and the drug trade. Former Mayor Philip Owen released a framework for action in 2000, and the City adopted a Four Pillars approach in May 2001. Since initiating such an approach, with its four pillars of harm reduction, prevention, treatment and enforcement (Campbell, 2003:4), the cities of Geneva, Zurich, Frankfurt and Sydney, Australia have seen a dramatic reduction in open drug use, overdose deaths and spread of disease (Campbell, 2003:6). In preparing for a similar implementation, the Vancouver Police has continued to be a proactive and professional police service.

Working in partnership with government and the community, the Vancouver Police Department has tried very hard to make the community a safer place. While the issues they face are not easy to tackle, the recent movement toward the harm reduction approach is a courageous forward step.

The Vancouver Police will be tasked with the enforcement pillar, which will include increased focus on the “for-profit” drug traffickers, and more awareness training for police on drug abuse (*An Alcohol and Drug Action Plan for the Downtown Eastside/Strathcona Draft Plan*, 2001:29).

The goal of the Citywide Enforcement Team, or CET, is to reduce disorder in the DTES so that the proposed injection site will be successful. Here I must recognize and address my own bias. The proposed injection sites for the DTES are called “safe injection sites,” which I believe, as do many others, is a misrepresentation: there is nothing safe about injecting heroin purchased from a street dealer into your body. If the government would like to call them “safe,” then the heroin should be produced, tested and supplied by government. Consequently, in this essay I will refer to these centres as “supervised

injection sites,” which I feel to be a more honest term — for much as they improve upon what currently exists, truly their only safeguard is that they are supervised.

People who want to use Supervised Injection Sites must be able to access them without having to run a gauntlet of dealers — and there must be a real punishment for people who refuse them. A drug user who is three blocks away from a supervised injection site, yet who runs no risk of apprehension by the police for using on a public street, will not generally make the three-block trek. Anyone who disputes this does not understand the power of addiction. People will, however, make that trek if they realize that using drugs on the street could get them arrested and charged, or at least could have their drugs destroyed by the police. Prior to the implementation of the CET, the state of police enforcement in the DTES was so understaffed that there was very little risk of losing one’s drugs.

The Vancouver Police have tried to find enough resources to return order to the DTES. Over the last couple of years this has meant reallocating resources to the area. However, the cost of such projects is often too great to sustain. One example of a police project which

showed how commitment and dedicated resources could resolve a problem, at least over a small area, was 2002's Project Seinfeld.

Project Seinfeld was a police operation based on the idea behind the popular situation comedy *Seinfeld*, which has been described as a show about nothing (Rich, 2003: Personal Interview). In this project, police officers were expected to stand in small groups in the epicenter of the drug trade in Vancouver, a City-owned community center known as the Carnegie Center. Police officers were simply to be a presence in the area. The Carnegie, at 401 Main Street, is also a home to services and outreach programs for homeless and drug-addicted people. The nearby drug trade and related disorder have consequently flourished, and have caused many legitimate businesses in the area to close, while others have expended an immense amount of money on private police in order to protect their customers. The tactic of placing highly visible police officers in front of the Carnegie Center is similar to the tactics of zero tolerance and Broken Windows Theory, in that the police department and its officers have reclaimed the space. Any obvious lawbreaking results in arrest; however, the focus of the officer's time is spent simply in being a presence, and in maintaining law and order (Rich, 2003: Personal Interview).

Project Seinfeld commenced on November 6, 2002 and concluded on January 6, 2003, during which time two officers from each shift spent time standing in front of 401 Main Street. An examination of Vancouver Police calls for service between Sept 5, 2002 and November 5, 2002 shows that 438 calls originated from that location, while during the two months of Project Seinfeld, only 244 calls were generated — a dramatic drop of 44% in the number of police calls for service to the Carnegie Centre (Rayment, 2003:2). The presence of police officers on a near constant basis at the Carnegie Centre had a spectacular effect on the calls for service and on public disorder.

The challenge for the Vancouver Police was the quite substantial cost of maintaining social order at 401 Main Street, a cost which was arguably not sustainable without the commitment of additional resources. Eventually these short-term projects must end, and ultimately the problems recur.

Under the leadership of Chief Constable Jamie Graham, the Vancouver Police have made the DTES an organizational priority. Graham and his senior management team see the restoration of order

in the DTES to be crucial to the success of the four pillars approach. Backed by a strong commitment from senior management, Inspector Jim Chu, Inspector Bob Rich, Inspector Doug Lepard and Sergeant Zannatta were tasked in 2003 with identifying and implementing the Citywide Enforcement Team.

Inspector Bob Rich first presented the CET to the Vancouver Police Board at their regular meeting on March 26, 2003. During this meeting, Inspector Rich described the Vancouver Police's support for the opening of supervised injection sites, and mentioned that two police Sergeants had been sent to Amsterdam and Sydney, Australia to see how the sites in these cities worked — and in particular, to learn how police coexisted with them. He further presented an organizational priority adopted by the police executive, to reduce the crime and disorder of illicit drug use in Vancouver. In order to accomplish this, the police department would form a three-month task force, in co-operation with the Health Board, with 60 dedicated police members. 40 of these officers would be assigned from throughout the department, while 20 would be current district 2 members. The City of Vancouver is made up of 4 policing districts; the DTES is part of district two which is the district which cover the northeast sector of the city. In addition to

assess the results of CET, two analysts would be assigned to monitor the results (*Vancouver Police Board: Minutes of the regular meeting, 2003:2*).

When the CET began its increased foot patrol presence in the DTES on April 7, 2003, the Vancouver Police Drug Squad had just completed a three-week operation called Project Torpedo. From March 18, 2003 to April 4, 2003, undercover police officers had purchased drugs from dealers in the DTES. In just three weeks, 162 individuals were arrested for trafficking — a number illustrative of the scope of the drug problem in the DTES (Campbell, 2003:15).

The CET initiative has been criticized by some and applauded by others. Media reporting has been generally positive; however, a Human Rights Watch report generated much discussion about alleged human rights violations at the hands of police in the DTES. Issued on May 7, 2003, one month after the CET became operational, this report describes the use of excessive force by police and widespread, arbitrary harassment (Bula, 2003:B3). The City of Vancouver responded to the report by saying that the allegations of police misconduct were based on hearsay and were not supported with

evidence. The response also affirms that the CET's impact on the health of drug users is very important to the city, and notes that additional resources have been put into place to ensure such impact is minimal. Another section explains the powers of Canadian police to detain people when they are suspected of committing a crime (Campbell, 2003:17)

Special Constable Ryan Prox of the Vancouver Police is one of the crime analysts assigned to monitor the CET. In his report on the project's first six weeks, he found that:

in almost every incident category, there is a marked reduction in the DTES for the month of April 2003 when compared to the same month for the previous year. Similarly, the number of incidents for the DTES in the month of April 2003 are lower in most categories compared to the month previous (Prox, 2003a:3).

Comparing April 2003 incident counts with those of April 2002, Prox concluded

that drug incidents in the DTES had decreased by 22%, and theft from autos had decreased by 14%. Robberies were down 40% from 2002, although break and enters showed a slight 2% increase. With regard to violent crime, the rate of assaults was down 5% from the previous year. However, the most interesting statistic is a huge 28% decline in assaults between March 2003 and April 2003 (Prox, 2003a:4).

In evaluating calls for service in the DTES, it should be noted that the number of such calls increased by 64.2% between 1991 and 2003, as compared to the city call load which increased by just 9.2%. Comparing the six-week period immediately prior to the CET (February 24, 2003 to April 4, 2003) with the project's first six weeks (April 5, 2003 to May 14, 2003), Prox found a 12% increase in calls for service. However, these results are skewed by the vast number of warrant arrests made by Project Torpedo over the former period. If one corrects for this by excluding the call type of "warrant" or "wagon," the increase is only 2%. In the outlying areas, or all other areas of district two, calls for service increased by 4% (Prox, 2003a:5).

Prox also analysed changes within the Overnight Log Book, a book used by Patrol Sergeants to log any major incidents — shootings, stabbings, criminal vehicle pursuits, large drug arrests, or any other incident of significant note. His review found a 64% decrease in the number of incidents of note in the DTES since CET became operational (Prox, 2003a:6).

One concern with the CET was that an increased police presence on the street might force users off the street, to less safe

environments. This was very much an issue for Mayor Campbell, who questioned whether the CET should be postponed until the supervised injection sites were open (*Vancouver Police Board: Minutes of the regular meeting*, 2003:2). However, Prox charted just 6 overdose deaths in the DTES in April 2003, a number consistent with past data (Prox, 2003a:6).

Helping the DTES presents many challenges. Police managers striving to find solutions are prepared to be innovative and courageous in order to try to start the DTES back on its road to healing. The introduction of Rational Choice Theory, Situational Crime Prevention and Broken Windows Theory is part of this road. In the next chapter, I will discuss my own research, and in particular my findings based on the research and theoretical review.



*Chapter Four- Research Methodology and Findings*

The decision to implement a temporary Citywide Enforcement Team into the Downtown Eastside was one I found very intriguing. I had worked as a patrol officer in the DTES from June 2000 to January 2002, initially assigned to the Hastings Street walking beat. It did not take me long to become frustrated with my role. The police were no more than babysitters, relatively ineffective at keeping a lid on the disorder in the area. The bulk of the time, as my two partners and I entered the 100 block East Hastings from the west, the problem people simply continued moving a block ahead of us. As police, we just moved people along, and they very quickly returned after we had moved through each particular block. I found this period very unrewarding.

This personal experience, combined with an academic interest in Broken Windows Theory and Zero Tolerance policing, compelled me to approach the District Two Police Commander, Inspector Bob Rich, to ask whether I might be considered to help research the proposed CET. I knew of the success with Project Seinfeld at the Carnegie

Centre, and believed that an expansion of this concept could bring positive changes to the Downtown Eastside.

The police managers who were the catalyst for the CET were Inspector Jim Chu and Inspector Bob Rich. Both Chu and Rich were aware of the successes that New York City had on crime with the NYPD focus on order maintenance and disorder issues. Inspectors Chu and Rich were very positive about the proposed CET and its similarities to New York City, however, the one point that they both made clear was that unlike New York's initiative, the CET's mandate would not involve zero tolerance. The police focus would be on disorder. Drug users would receive an initial warning, and after a predetermined transition period, drug users who still openly used drugs on the street might be arrested (Chu & Rich, 2003: Personal Interview).

Early discussions occurred regarding access to information and confidentiality issues. On March 5, 2003 I met with Inspector Chu and Sergeant Tony Zannatta, and expressed my concerns about research ethics, and the potential for gatekeepers to keep certain information from me. For my research to be credible, I must feel comfortable submitting results even if they showed that the police did not have an

impact. I was assured full cooperation and full autonomy. In discussion of my research needs, Inspector Chu gave me the timeline for the Vancouver Police proposal to the Vancouver City Council, and suggested that pre-surveys and post-surveys from service providers in the area could also add validity. We agreed that the Vancouver Police would provide equipment (cars, plainclothes radio holsters, radios) and human resources (at least two plainclothed police officers to follow the students) to my project. As it turned out, the second walkalong required the Vancouver Police to incur overtime costs, which displayed the department's commitment to the project and its evaluation.

I fully recognized that I was a "inside insider" (Brown, 1996) in (Reiner, 2000:220), Brown's term for police officers who conduct degree research on their own department. Even though I had overcome the first hurdle, of access to information, I would have others. For example, several officers assigned to the CET expressed some bitterness and resistance to the project, having not been assigned there willingly. To them I simply explained my independence from the project, noting that I would simply evaluate the effectiveness of the police. Several of the officers assigned were junior to me in service, and had recently graduated from the Justice Institute of British

Columbia Police Academy, at which I teach — a fact which proved an additional advantage in distancing myself from the CET. The academy is located outside of Vancouver, giving me no cause to enter the DTES except for research. In addition, although I was offered overtime shifts in uniform in the DTES during this study, I refused them to minimize bias.

My principal methodology was to have five students unfamiliar with the DTES walk through the neighborhood and record quantitative observations about public disorder and/or drug use. I was aware of the issues involved in doing field research, but the research question, Could police make a positive difference to public disorder and crime in a community in crisis could only be tested in the field. No laboratory can provide an adequate environment to test police impact on public disorder and crime. The observational methods of this field experiment would lead to a highly realistic study.

The downsides of this were many. My first issue to contend with was that I am a police officer who had worked in the DTES before. I remained fairly well known to many criminals in the area, and so I could clearly not make field observations myself. I then considered asking

police recruits to perform the observations, new officers who had never been assigned to the street, and were still in their academy training. However, this choice presented its own ethical difficulties, for police recruits, although they lack any operational experience, are already police officers as defined by the BC Police Act — and they would have both a legal and ethical obligation to make arrests when they saw public disorder drug offences.

I finally opted to use criminology students from a local university at which I teach, Kwantlen University College. I presented this as a volunteer opportunity after I had finished teaching their course, so that my grading would have no influence on them. Another advantage of using students, rather than relying solely on police reports and accounts, was the introduction of independent third parties into the analysis. My research would not be voided by having a police researcher directly conduct field observations on the police.

Much has been written about the difficulty of researching police work. For example, the very nature of police work can complicate research:

Much policing is dangerous dirty work: getting people to do what they don't want to do, or making them desist from doing what they want to do. The tactics used for accomplishing this are almost inevitably going to be controversial even if they are legal, and they are frequently of dubious legality or clearly illegal (Reiner, 2000:218).

Another difficulty in evaluating the police is the underreporting of minor incidents. “[O]fficial police record substantially underreport, and perhaps distort, disorder problems” (Katz et al., 2001: 10), and police scholars maintain that this occurs largely because officers are more likely to handle such incidents informally (Black, 1980; Sherman, 1986; Skogan, 1990) in (Katz et al., 2001: 10). Black’s observational study of police in Boston, Chicago, and Washington D.C. found that only about 40% of minor complaints were recorded officially. Moreover, “Many police scholars have recognized Calls for Service as a more reliable indicator of change in crime and disorder, particularly when examining place based police interventions (Green, 1995). I considered simply examining calls for service however, there were several complicating factors using only that approach. The main issue was that the CET was to be a highly visible police presence, as such officers were discouraged from making arrests and going off the street. In addition, many of the Vancouver Police stats are in a state of transition because of the implementation of a new police records management system,

PRIME. This system requires officers to put more reports in on incidents that previously may have been simply resolved with no official report of the incident.

To ensure a more accurate view of the DTES, I also considered triangulations (*Research Methods: Module Three, 2001:1-17*). For this purpose, I originally decided to conduct both pre-CET and post-CET surveys of people in the DTES. However, the Vancouver Police engaged an independent research company, Pollara, to conduct very similar post-CET surveys to my own, with much greater methodological means than I could bring to bear. I will therefore discuss Pollara's findings as a point of triangulation on the issues of public disorder in the DTES.

Our first student walk occurred on March 27, 2003, this was a Thursday, one day after the social assistance checks have been given out. Five students came to the main police building, at 312 Main Street in the core of the Downtown Eastside. Three of the student's were male and two of the students were female. The males ranged in age from 24 to 40 years of age and the females ranged from 23 to 34. I had asked the students to dress appropriately for the area, by which I

meant neither too flashy nor too dressed down. Sergeant Zannatta, Constable Ryley Swanson and I met the students in the station's fourth-floor boardroom, where I took digital photographs to ensure that all five could wear the same or similar clothing on the second walk.

Sergeant Zannatta, who has many years of police experience including several on police surveillance teams, gave the students a safety briefing prior to their going on the street. He specifically gave advice on how to walk in the area in order to mimic a drug user, and spoke of eye contact and the need to not focus on anyone. In addition, he covered safety issues particular to the female students: violence by women against women, and the need for female researchers to be particularly cautious. He then presented a cover story if the students were challenged: each should say they were looking for their sister in the area. This is unfortunately is a common occurrence, family members coming into the Downtown Eastside to rescue or provide support for loved ones addicted to drugs. Sergeant Zannatta also showed the students some of the weapons of choice in the Downtown Eastside, including firearms and knives, and gave a detailed account of radio procedures if an emergency situation occurred. The student would be carrying a police radio; while running out of the area, they

should press the “push to talk” button and give an account of their exact location. The briefing concluded by explaining common drug language such as “up,” (cocaine) “down,” (heroin) “Crack,” (rock cocaine) “You got,” (do you have drugs to sell, or do you have money to purchase drugs), tweaking (common in the DTES when someone is coming down from cocaine use they sometimes are searching the ground for small pieces of cocaine, it looks like a funny dance) and “looking to score (are you looking to purchase drugs).” I fully appreciated that this kind of briefing could influence the students’ observations; however, I believe that the need for safety pre-empted any other consideration.

Another choice which maximized the students’ safety was to have plainclothes police available to respond to any crisis the students encountered as they walked in the DTES. The students would walk only on public streets, a choice which I believed would be least intrusive to the people they were observing, and which would thus provide the best results. I recognized that the students might be anxious; however, I ensured their safety as best I could by having two armed police officers available to them at all times.

The plainclothes surveillance team would follow the students from some distance, yet would be in a position to reach them quickly if the need arose. The unique subculture of the DTES is such that plainclothes police are almost immediately spotted, and identified by a system of whistling, yelling “5-0,” or yelling “six” to alert all others on the street; consequently, the police were never in the same block as the students.

I then began briefing the students on their research goals. Each student received a copy of the survey definitions, so that they could take it on their walk to refer to if necessary. Please refer to Appendix A.

After asking the students if they had any questions about the definition of public disorder, I explained that they would each be given two clickers, one to carry in each pocket. Walking with their hands in their pockets, they would simply click their observations with the appropriate hand. The left hand would track drug use or drug approaches — the mnemonic was suggested of “L” for “Leave it alone” — while the right clicker would track any public disorder.

The students were told to leave the police station and head south along Main Street to Hastings Street. They would proceed westbound on the north side of Hastings until they reached Cambie Street. At Cambie Street they should cross to south side of Hastings Street, and then proceed eastbound on the south side of Hastings to Main Street, where they would enter the police station. They were to spend about 45 minutes walking casually and slowly, stopping in places if they wanted, but under no circumstance to deviate from this route.

The students were given the opportunity to change their minds if anyone felt uncomfortable with doing the observations. None of the students did.

Sergeant Zannatta placed a radio holster on the first student (hereafter referred to as "S1"), readying her to go, at 1845 hours; however, she was delayed while the Vancouver Police resolved a report of a man with a gun in the 100 block East Hastings. At 1851 hours, she departed with a cover team. At 1859 hours, the cover team had to move in close to her because of a police call that a man had been stabbed in the head at a licensed premise in the area.

Nevertheless, S1 returned to the station at 1930 hours, having recorded 15 instances of public disorder and 12 drug uses or approaches. S1 had been out for a total of 39 minutes.

It became clear upon S1's return to the station that she was quite frightened and concerned. What had been planned only as quantitative research quickly became qualitative too, as S1 needed a debriefing interview in order to discuss the things that she had seen. The results of that interview are at Appendix B.

The second student, S2, left the station at 1933 hours and returned at 2005 hours. S2 had recorded 1 instance of public disorder and 28 drug uses or approaches over 32 minutes of observations. Once again I interviewed S2, the results of that interview are at Appendix C.

The third student, S3, left at 2006 hours and returned at 2045 hours, recording 5 instances of public disorder and 15 drug uses or approaches in 39 minutes. S3's comments are at Appendix D.

The fourth student, S4, left at 2048 hours but soon returned, having forgotten the clickers. S4 left again at 2055 hours and returned at 2133 hours, having recorded 102 instances of public disorder and 35 drug uses or approaches in 38 minutes. S4 interview comments are at Appendix E.

The fifth student, S5, left at 2135 hours and returned at 2200 hours, having recorded 19 instances of public disorder and 25 drug uses or approaches in 25 minutes. It should be noted that over the course of the evening, four armed robberies had occurred in a police district several miles away from the DTES. While S5 was out, the police arrested the robbery suspect in the 100 block East Hastings. This event gives some credence to the Rational Choice Theory concept that the Downtown Eastside is a one-stop shop for criminals.

Having been involved in some other research for the VPD, S5 was less traumatized by the walkaround than the other students. Nevertheless, S5 had never been in the area without a uniformed police officer alongside. S5 interview comments are at Appendix F.

Through the evening, the students made observations for a total of 174 minutes. During the same period, the DTES saw three serious priority police calls: the man with the gun, the man stabbed in the head, and the arrest of the robbery suspect. It should be noted also that this night was a cold, dark night. Of note also is that the social assistance cheques had been given out the day before the observations, which traditionally results in a higher sense of disorder and call load in the Downtown Eastside. The students recorded a total of 268 incidents of public disorder, drug use, and/or drug approaches in 174 minutes, which works out to one incident every 39 seconds.

These observations provided a baseline for the level of public disorder in the DTES prior to the implementation of the CET.

On April 4, 2003 I attended the Citywide Enforcement Team planning meeting, which was held at a venue outside the City of Vancouver. Before the meeting started, I surveyed the officers in the room that had been assigned to the DTES in the previous 60 days.

Two students had also arranged to conduct the same survey on service providers in the DTES. The return rate for the survey was very poor, and as such I have decided to exclude it from the research.

Chief Constable Jamie Graham began the CET meeting by speaking about his vision for the DTES, and the need to restore order to a community in crisis. He thanked the officers for the sacrifices they had been called upon to make, and stressed the VPD Senior Management Team's commitment to this project.

Inspector Bob Rich, the District Commander for District Two, and Inspector Doug Lepard, Inspector in charge of CET, next spoke about their goals for the project. Both of them stressed the need to do something proactive about the DTES, even if it was not guaranteed to work. They also encouraged team members to be proactive and professional with drug traffickers. The Inspectors were clear that any unprofessional performance by police members would not be tolerated. Searches should be conducted when appropriate and arrest made when there was the requisite grounds to arrest. In addition they spoke about the tragedy and hardship of drug addiction and encouraged police members to be firm but to remain empathetic towards drug users.

This set the day's tone, and other speakers carried the same message through their material. A representative from the Coastal Health Authority provided an easy-to-understand notebook card which police officers could carry, describing what health resources were available for drug users. Sergeant Milligan from the Internal Investigation Section spoke about professional conduct and the department's expectations of members while conducting their duties. He also led a brief discussion of verbal communication skills for dealing with difficult people. The Police Department's media people spoke about the intense media attention that would be drawn to the area because of the polarization of the issues. Some people in the community saw the CET as an attack on the poor, while others believed CET would force drug users into more dangerous situations. The police believe that in order for supervised injection sites to work a baseline of consequence needed to be set for open air drug use, otherwise there would be no incentive for drug users to walk to the supervised injection sites.

Finally, Sergeant Zannatta outlined various tactics and facilitated a discussion of strategy. Once again it was reiterated that a completely

zero tolerance approach was not being taken. Police officers were discouraged from making arrests for possession of controlled drugs. Instead, officers should encourage public users of illicit substances to be more discreet, and reeducate the users about the new rules of not using drugs on the street. However, the officers were encouraged to take a Zero Tolerance approach to drug traffickers, and moreover were advised that their first few days on the street would be very busy because of the culmination of Project Torpedo. Warrants for the arrest of traffickers who had sold to undercover police operators would be issued on the first day of the CET.

The CET officially began on April 5, 2003 at 0700 hours. Four squads of a Sergeant and 14 Constables each were created to provide 20 hours per day coverage, every day of the week. At any time during the hours of 0700 to 0300 there would be at least 15 police officers on foot in the DTES. Their mandate, an extension of Project Seinfeld, was simply to be a presence, assuming turf ownership of a single block for every two partners. Officers would discourage disorder and crime by their sheer presence.

In order to create an intense police presence, various other areas of the Police Department supplied officers on a rotating basis for foot patrol in the DTES. Detectives and even senior managers put on a uniform for a day, walking the beat. Moreover, traffic enforcement, the Emergency Response Team, and the Mounted Squad were all detailed to spend their non-deployed time in the DTES.

On May 29, 2003, sixty-three days after the previous student walk, we met again to perform more field observations. This date was chosen because it was the day after the social assistance checks were handed out. Further the weather on this date was warm and clear. The observations made by the students were made in lighter conditions, as sunset was later than the previous walkaround. This would test whether the introduction of the CET into the DTES has had an impact on public disorder and crime.

Sergeant Zannatta and Police Constable Andy Russell agreed to provide cover teams for the students. The students, who had been asked to dress identically or similarly to their outfits on the first walk, received a quick refresher briefing, covering safety, street language,

the use of the clickers, and the definitions of public disorder. The students traveled the same route as the first walkaround.

S5 had other commitments later in the evening, and requested to go first. S5 left the police station at 1743 hours and returned at 1811 hours, for a total of 28 minutes of observations. S5 recorded 5 instances of public disorder and 8 drug uses or approaches. S5 interview comments are at Appendix G.

S2 left at 1815 hours and returned at 1848 hours, a total of 33 minutes. S2 recorded 6 instances of public disorder and 5 drug uses or approaches. S2 comments are recorded at Appendix H.

S1 left at 1850 hours and returned at 1924 hours, recording 7 instances of public disorder and 1 drug use or approach in a total of 34 minutes of observations. S1 interview comments are at Appendix I.

S4 left at 1932 hours and returned at 2016 hours, a total of 44 minutes of observations, recording 6 instances of public disorder and 2 drug uses or approaches. S4 interview comments are at Appendix J.

S3 left at 2021 hours and returned at 2102 hours, for a total of 41 minutes of observations. S3 recorded 6 instances of public disorder and 5 drug uses or approaches. S3 Comments are at Appendix K.

The students observed a total of 53 incidents of public disorder, drug uses, or drug approaches in 180 minutes of observations. This works out to one incident every 203 seconds, which is just over 3 and 1/3 minutes.

Having considered the current academic debates about whether police matter, and also having discussed the methodology of the current study, we must now consider the value of this research — for it is not exhaustive, nor should any concrete positions be taken because of it. I would, however, suggest that the experiences of student observers in the DTES, both pre-CET and post CET, indicate that police efforts have made a positive change in the arena of public disorder. I will discuss this later in more detail, but first let us triangulate the study by looking at some pertinent survey results.

Because time and resources were lacking, and the return rate was minimal, I abandoned my own initial survey of police and other service providers. I also abandoned my planned follow-up survey upon learning that the Vancouver Police Department had engaged an independent research firm, Pollara, to carry out very similar research with much greater means. The one conclusion I will draw from the initial survey results is that prior to the CET, police officers overwhelmingly held the belief that they could have an impact on crime and disorder in the DTES. The information received from Pollara supports this belief.

Pollara conducted a total of 708 interviews between June 6, 2003 and June 10, 2003, eight weeks after the CET began. Of these interviews, 202 were conducted with residents of the DTES, while 506 other Vancouver residents were surveyed. The research found that 83% of DTES residents had noticed an increased police presence (*A Pollara Report for the Vancouver Police Department*

*Opinions of Residents and Businesses Regarding the City-wide Enforcement Team Project, 2003:2*). Moreover, 63% of DTES businesses, 62% of DTES residents and 58% of Vancouver residents

believed that the CET had had an impact on restoring order in the DTES (*A Pollara Report for the Vancouver Police Department*

*Opinions of Residents and Businesses Regarding the City-wide Enforcement Team Project, 2003:3*). In addition, 85% of DTES residents said they would support the continuation of the CET (*A Pollara Report for the Vancouver Police Department*

*Opinions of Residents and Businesses Regarding the City-wide Enforcement Team Project, 2003:4*). The level of support was particularly high from disadvantaged, low-income residents of the DTES, whose strong support for the police efforts belies some of the media coverage that the police were being heavy-handed or excessive.

Of my own findings, the students' comments are as telling as the actual quantitative research. One can read from them that the first, pre-CET walkaround was a traumatic experience for most of the students. Despite the knowledge that they were conducting an experiment, with two dedicated police officers nearby for their assistance, they found the DTES a scary place to be. What, then, must have been the experience for tourists and others who visited the DTES? Should the city continue to allow such conditions of disorder, crime and fear to exist? Further, what are the costs of public safety

compared to the cost of lost future income from tourists who don't return to the city? How many out-of-province vehicles must be broken into before Vancouver gets a bad reputation for crime?

Considering the students' comments is particularly illuminating upon comparing the first walk to the second. Consider S1 who on the first walk stated, "I didn't feel safe in the area," to the second walk, "I was way more relaxed: there was so many police." Furthermore, the large crowds that this student had previously found intimidating were no longer present. I believe this shows that the level of public disorder in the area has also decreased.

S2 described her experience of the first walk as "scared and intimidated". Just 60 days later, the second walk is described as "pleasant, cleaner, and not intimidating". S2, like S1, commented on the number of police, illustrating once again how the introduction of additional police to the area has affected the fear of disorder and crime.

Once again, S3 describes on the first walk observations of "large groups of people on the street openly doing drugs". On the second walk he describes it as "a lot more comfortable." Without large groups, "I did not have any concerns for my safety." Once more this

bears out how the perception of fear has improved, as a direct result of more police presence and less public disorder.

S4 stated that making observations on the first walk is described as difficult, because so much was going on. On the second walk, his observations are often alcohol-related, an issue which has always existed in the DTES. Nonetheless S4 still describes the experience as “a lot safer, partially because it was daylight, and also because of the number of cops, they seemed to be everywhere.” Once again we see that the mere presence of police in the area has had an impact on the level of disorder.

The observations made by S5 have to be considered in a slightly different light from those of the first four students. S5 made fewer observations than the others on his first walkaround, but while he was out, the Vancouver Police made a highly visible arrest of an armed robbery suspect. This type of incident, during which several of the officers pointed firearms at the suspect, can of itself affect the level of disorder in the area. S5 does comment that after the police had left, the crowd began to form again. In his second walk, S5 says that he saw fewer people and that the street did not seem as crazy. Those

unfamiliar with the DTES may consider the time of day or lighting a significant consideration or variable, however, the DTES has always been busy with public disorder and crime at all hours of the day.

The quantitative research also shows the difference between the two walkarounds:

Table 1

Walk Around	Number of Serious Calls	Observation Time	Number of Public Order or Drug Use/Drug Approach	Frequency
First Night	3 total <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Man with a Gun</li> <li>• Man Stabbed</li> <li>• Armed Robbery Arrest</li> </ul>	174 minutes	268 incidents	1 every 39 seconds
Second Night	None	180 minutes	53 incidents	1 every 203 seconds

The students' observations and comments have shown that the police can have an impact on disorder and crime. Admittedly, all of the students still described incidents of public disorder, drug uses, and/or drug approaches on the second walk, but its frequency was not nearly so high. The CET is not expected to eradicate all public disorder in the DTES. The DTES may always have more crime and disorder than other Vancouver neighborhoods, but at least with the introduction of CET the level has become manageable. Though citizens may still consider the DTES to be a rougher than normal part of town, it is no longer out of control. With continued support, and commitment of time and resources in a considered balance between Situational Crime Prevention, Broken Windows Theory and enhancement of resources to treat root causes of crime, it may be possible for the DTES to become once again a prosperous, safe and thriving community.

I must also concede a degree of displacement of the problem. Although, space limitations do not allow for much discussion of displacement in this paper, the police have found that some people have moved their drug operations to other parts of the city. Cathedral Square, Granville Mall and the Commercial Drive area have all seen slight increases in public disorder. Other cities in Greater Vancouver,

such as Surrey and New Westminster, have also shown some increases.

Some police officers believe from these data that the CET has failed — that the problems have simply moved. I firmly disagree. Although the problems of drug addiction, public disorder, and crime associated with supporting drug habits will never be eradicated by simply adding more police to an area, the placement of those police must ensure that the levels of public disorder are manageable. People will put up with some public disorder as a necessary evil of urban life, but they will not be so tolerant when it becomes severe enough to have a significant impact on their lives. The people of New York City elected Rudy Giuliani as Mayor in November of 1993, on a platform of being fed up with the sheer amount of public disorder in their streets. It is this constant public disorder that makes a city appear unsafe. Smaller pockets of public disorder may be irritants, but people tend to adjust to them. Prior to CET, the DTES was simply a place that most citizens avoided because of the prolific and open drug use.

The CET, in adopting the principles of Problem-Oriented Policing and intelligence-led policing, could vastly improve the safety of

all citizens in Vancouver, not just of those of the DTES. The police must continue in their efforts in the DTES, but when the time comes — and it will — that other areas have started to present a significant problem, then a redeployment of CET can have the same impact. This constant moving of the CET will affect overall crime levels, because it takes time for the criminal element to get established in a new area. The criminals must adjust to their new environment and learn the geography of the area, and police apprehensions will be easier. If the CET can keep these people constantly in flux, eventually their criminal enterprise will tumble.

## *Chapter Five - Conclusions*

The ongoing debate about the value of the police and can they make a difference through order maintenance approaches to crime control is both dynamic and in its infancy. The debates continue between Harcourt and Kelling et al about the true causes of the decreases in crime in New York City. After CET was announced in Vancouver both Harcourt and Wilson were contacted by local media to give their spin on the projected outcomes. The research conducted here does add to the debates. Primarily the addition is in taking some of the conclusions that Harcourt made about the successes in New York City and applying them to the Vancouver successes and being able to differentiate between what occurred in Vancouver and what occurred in New York City recognizing that other places had a reduction in crime.

The research provides additional information for the debate and some of the findings add to the proponents of broken windows and some of the findings adds to the evidence of the detractors of Broken Windows. In summary of the material from Chapter Two, Harcourt claims that there is no empirical evidence to support the Broken Windows Theory (Harcourt, 2001: 57). Skogan and Keeling disagree

and believe that the study conducted by Skogan shows that crime and disorder are linked- and that this has been empirically validated (G. Kelling & Coles, 1996: 24). Essentially Kelling, Skogan and Wilson argue that the rate of serious crime is directly related to the level of disorder in a community. In Skogan's study he measured the rate of robbery as the crime indicator and found that in neighborhoods with increased disorder, crime (robbery) was higher. Harcourt has attempted to replicate those findings and is very critical because of Skogan's data collection and manipulation. Harcourt does not believe that serious crime and disorder are related.

Harcourt further believes that the primary reason for the reduction in New York's crime rate was because of increased police surveillance, and policies of aggressive stop and search, and arrest (Harcourt, 2001: 100). In addition, Harcourt believes that the increased size of the police force, shifting drug use patterns, new computerized tracking systems and demographics all played a role in the reduction of crime (Harcourt, 2001: 103). Explicitly, Harcourt rejects the Broken Windows Theory espoused by Kelling et al. The research conducted on the DTES provides some evidence that disputes Harcourt's claims about the reduction in crime in New York City. The first consideration is that the officers assigned to the DTES were not instructed to take a

zero tolerance approach to drug use. They were instructed to take a zero tolerance approach to other types of crime and disorder. Simply their presence and the issuing of violation tickets was used to minimize the disorder in the area.

Further, the officers assigned to CET were unable to simply do stop and searches or aggressive tactics as suggested by Harcourt to be an imperative ingredient to the success of the NYPD in New York. Canadian law does not allow for such stops by police on mere suspicion. This makes this current research important because it is conducted within the Canadian context and it provides some evidence to discount Harcourt claim that crime can only be reduced if police resort to excesses in the law. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains protections for citizens that denies the police the latitude to make arbitrary stop and searches like in other countries. This research appears to be the first of its kind conducted on Broken Windows Theory in a Canadian context. Canada has different laws than the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. In particular, Canada has an emphasis in its criminal justice system for human rights protections. The methods utilized in New York City with its application of city ordinances, and in England of stop and search provisions under PACE cannot be used in Canada. Police in Canada

can only legally detain someone if they have articulable cause to believe they have been involved in a crime. The CET were able to have an impact on crime and disorder even with some of the restrictive police powers that do not exist in other countries. The sheer prolonged presence of police in the DTES made the disorder minimize. The fact that CET had the impact on crime and disorder, and that it did without the aggressive methods that Harcourt suggested was part of the reason for New York's successes provides some evidence which weakens Harcourt's position. If the police were able to reduce crime and disorder through their sheer presence (capable guardians) then maybe the opportunity theorist have more reliability.

In addition, Harcourt might argue that the CET used powers to search people for very minor offences. This brings us to another criticism of Harcourt's work. Harcourt appears to consistently be critical of the police involving themselves in minor or in his mind non-consequential crimes. In his book, *Illusion of Order*, he suggests this in several places and this weakens his credibility. In Harcourt's slant the laws that deal with drunks, panhandlers and squeegee people are in place to give the police the power to remove these people from the street in order to restore order (Harcourt, 2001:128). Harcourt minimizes the impacts or seriousness of these public order crimes in

the community. In fact, Harcourt appeals to the reader and suggests that we have all been guilty of some of these minor public order offences (Harcourt, 2001: 130). Irrespective of Broken Windows Theory all of these minor public order offences have consequences for the community and the individual offender. If the police did not have the ability to arrest drunks on the street, many more alcoholic street people would die due to exposure or drunkenness. Further the panhandler or the squeegee washer who is able to survive resorting to such activities to support themselves is unlikely to connect with proper social housing or services which may impact on their quality of life. Furthermore, the presence of semi-conscious drunks on the street, squeegee people and panhandler does impact on peoples perception of safety.

Another discrepancy found in the research on the DTES is Harcourts believe that the crime rate in New York decreased because of an increase in arrests. The CET made a total of 1207 arrests between April 2003 and June 2003, however these arrests have been continually declining for a total reduction of 22% from the inception of CET (Prox, 2003b:3). Therefore CET is now making less arrests, however, public order has continued to increase as the crime rate has decreased within the DTES.

A weakness of these studies of disorder and crime is the definitions of disorder. I too have this as weakness in my research because regrettably I used definitions of disorder that in of themselves also constituted crimes. Consequently, if disorder decreased, so then did crime. For my study disorder was defined as fights, assaults, breaches of the peace, mischief, disturbances, drug use or drug approaches. All of these types of behaviors are in of themselves crimes.

In reviewing Skogan's definitions of social disorder one finds a similarity in his definitions of disorder to mine. He too defines acts of disorder that are also crimes, albeit crimes of minimal consequence. Skogan refers to social disorder as public drinking, prostitution, sexual harassment, and vandalism which by Canadian law are all sanctioned by criminal or quasi criminal law. Further, Skogan's physical disorder abandoned or ill kept buildings, broken streetlights, trash-filled lots and alleys strewn with garbage (Skogan, 1990: 4) are all regulated under municipal by-laws. In essence the definition of disorder that I used in the study of the CET and DTES has done is not so much added directly to the broken windows debate. If one was to truly be testing this theory then I should have had the students simply record incidents of public disorder that were not also crimes. This issue is consistent

with the disorder that Kelling, Skogan, and Wilson use in their research. The disorder they use is also crime albeit minor in nature. Then if one accepts this, the question is can police impact on crime or the perception or fear of crime.

In my study of the Broken Windows Theory in the Downtown Eastside I conclude that the introduction of additional police officers assigned to specific blocks, with a mandate to minimize disorder by their constant presence in that block has resulted in a decrease in disorder and crime. This conclusion is based on the following three pieces of research, one, the students observations during the two walkalongs, two, the Pollara study of various residents of the DTES and their perceptions about community safety, and finally based on the analysis of the crime data completed by Prox.

The student walkalongs research used observational methods and concluded that after 63 days and the introduction of CET into the DTES that there was an 80% reduction in observed incidents of disorder/crime. The presence of the CET had impacted on the neighborhood and where before there was chaos now there was calmness.

Considering the work of the Pollara group in making my conclusions, one must consider that 63% of DTES businesses, 62% of DTES residents and 58% of Vancouver residents believe that CET has had an impact on restoring order in the DTES. Further 51% of DTES businesses, 45% of DTES residents and 50% of Vancouver residents believe that the DTES is safer now because of CET (*A Pollara Report for the Vancouver Police Department Opinions of Residents and Businesses Regarding the City-wide Enforcement Team Project, 2003: 3*). The above survey results provide evidence that the CET has had an impact on the perception of disorder and safety amongst the people of Vancouver. This is further compelling independent evidence that supports the belief that police do matter and attacking public disorder can reduce crime or fear of it.

Finally an analysis of the CET statistical package prepared by Special Constable Ryan Prox is further illustrative of the impact that CET has had on the level of disorder and crime in the DTES. The DTES has experienced a further decrease of 11% in overall crime in the month of July 2003 from July 2002. The total amount of reported crime since CET began in April 2003 to July 2003 compared to the same period in 2002 is a drop of 8% (Prox, 2003b: 3). Specifically

related to violent crime, homicide is down 50% compared to July 2002, albeit a change from 2 homicides in 2002 to 1 in 2003. Further, robberies are down by 21% from the previous July. Of note the rate of assaults in the DTES is slightly up by 3% however the entire City of Vancouver is up by 6% (Prox, 2003b: 3).

In the area of property crime there are some mixed results. Burglaries are up by 27% and thefts are up by 13% in the DTES, while theft from autos is down 43% and theft of autos is down by 41% (Prox, 2003b: 3). Notwithstanding some increases in property crime in the area of burglaries and thefts these crime reduction still provide evidence that the CET and its reduction in disorder is also impacting on the level of crime.

Considering some of the other relevant academic debates such as, Rational Choice Theory, Routine Activity Theory and Situational Crime Prevention Theory suggest that the opportunity to commit crime is of primary focus in creating environments that deter offenders. Prior to the introduction of the CET into the DTES there were very few capable guardian and the presence of drug traffickers made the area very easy to commit criminal acts. The CET has increased the number

of capable guardians and has also decreased the rewards for committing crime. The sheer presence of the police combined with an ability to arrest people for actions that previously would go untouched for has promoted a belief amongst the people of the DTES that the police can make a difference. Public disorder now results in consequence where before it rarely did.

In following with Wang's research on robberies by street gangs and his conclusions that offenders weigh the cost of and benefits of committing crime. It is apparent from the decrease in open drug use in the DTES that by introducing the CET, that drug users and dealers have made a rational choice to move, go inside, or to not go to the DTES in the first place. Like Wang, this researcher does not believe that the drug users in the DTES have miraculously cured their addiction, they simply have completed a cost benefit analysis and recognize with a police officer in every block the open use of drugs will result in drug seizures and possibly arrest. The CET has changed the equation of cost analysis which prior to its implementation invariably won out as a good risk.

Further following in the work of Cornish and Clarke that the criminal commits the crime because the opportunity presents itself, the Mardi Gras, anything goes atmosphere of the DTES prior to the implementation of the CET created an environment where people saw ample opportunity to commit crime, public disorder with minimal consequence. The same behavior in other parts of Vancouver or in the surrounding communities would result in police enforcement.

Continuing where Exum's study concluded that people under the influence of alcohol are not necessarily able to make rational choices, the research in the DTES adds to that discussion. The drug users of the DTES did not quit using drugs with the introduction of CET. The users made rational choices about where and when to use those drugs. Displacement did occur into hotel rooms and hallways, out of the public view. This change in venue for drug use shows a rational choice because drug users did not want to have their drugs seized by the police.

In addition this research adds to the current research that has concluded that proactive policing methods do impact on crime and

disorder (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Katz et al., 2001; Sherman & Weisburd, 1995; Weiss & Freels, 1996; J.Q. Wilson & Boland, 1978).

In considering Situational Crime Prevention Theory this research into the DTES has added to its debates in that the CET introduction into the DTES has reduced the opportunities for crime by the constant presence of the police. The CET has had an impact on the opportunity for rewards for crime in the DTES. In comparing the number of customers, items pawned, and dollar value since the inception of the CET one sees a clear decrease. In comparing just two one week periods, March 13<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> 2003, (prior to CET) and May 22<sup>nd</sup> to May 28<sup>th</sup>, 2003 (CET) significant reductions have been made. There has been a 16% reduction in customers, 16% in items pawned, and 29% reduction dollar value of items pawned from 168,076.17 dollars in March to 119, 661.81 in May (Prox, 2003b: 23).

Further related to situational crime prevention Prox believes that there has been displacement but because this displacement has made the crime cycle geographically larger this requires longer periods between crimes because it now takes longer to pawn, purchase drugs and then use drugs.

Ultimately the research into the DTES did not consider root causes of crime. This lack of consideration was deliberate because in absence of “street rules” and consequences the DTES cannot begin to tackle root causes through therapy, rehabilitation or supervised injection sites.

On September 15, 2003 the City of Vancouver opened the first “Safe Injection Site” in North America. The harm reduction policies that the Canadian government, Federal, Provincial and Municipal are undertaking are in place to try and reduce the number of people dying from overdoses and the cost of drug addiction. The CET had to be put into the DTES to establish a basis of order otherwise well intentioned drug addicts would be running the gauntlet of drug dealers and users. The commitment that the Vancouver Police and in particular the officers assigned to CET is a true community police initiative. The people of the DTES form a community in crisis and the police in partnership with that community are working towards finding solutions to bring about a safer environment for all people who reside in the DTES.

Furthermore the Vancouver Police in recognizing both the results of this research, additional anecdotal research and the research conducted by Pollara have committed to not giving up what they have gained. The Vancouver Police will be continuing the CET project and though it was initially only proposed as a 90 day pilot project it was recently approved by the Chief Constable to continue indefinitely in a similar form.

In closing the DTES is a community in crisis. The Vancouver Police have recognized the principles of the various academic theories and have blended them into a strategy to restore order in the DTES. Continued efforts by the community, the police, the government should make the turn from past fatalistic policy. Further with the introduction of order into the area, then some of the root causes could possibly be addressed.

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## *Appendix A*

**Downtown Eastside:** The area in Vancouver bordered by Hamilton Street to the West, Powell Street to the North, Campbell Street to the East and Pender Street to the South.

**Public Disorder:** Includes all fights, assaults, breaches of the peace (Br/Peace), mischief and disturbances which occur in all public places or in a licensed premise.

**Fight:** Where two or more persons engage in a physical confrontation.

**Assault:** Where a person physically touches, hits, kicks or spits on another person.

**Assault on a Police Officer:** Where a person touches, hits, kicks, spits on a police officer in the execution of his or her duties. To also resist arrest by a police officer.

**Breach of the Peace (Br/Peace):** Any incident where people are gathered or acting in a manner which causes concern due to their rowdiness, state of intoxication, or loud or obscene use of language or behaviour.

**Mischief:** Where a person damages property.

**Disturbance:** Any time that a person's actions disturbs the ability of others to use the area.

**Drug Use:** Any time a person is observed using an illegal substance such as marijuana, cocaine, or heroin.

**Drug Approach:** Any time a person is offered the use of or the ability to purchase an illegal drug or substance.

*A p p e n d i x B*

**Student One First Walk Interview Comments**

- The first thing that happened I saw two people screaming across the street from each other. They were screaming and saying fuck off to each other.
- Two or three guys on the right side of the street, and one of the guys approached me in a manner to try and grab me.
- I went too far and it became apparent the difference because there was an older lady smiling at me, clean people, shops. I knew I went too far.
- I saw a guy urinating in an open lot against a building.
- No one tried to sell me drugs on the north side.
- Coming down the other side I saw more people, my heart was racing.
- I saw a man with a needle holding like he was trying to get it ready to use.
- There was another guy asking for a pipe.
- Three people asked me if I wanted to buy drugs. They were all women.
- One asked if I wanted to buy some "white rock."
- There was about 4 or 5 people drinking out of bottles.
- I saw another guy trying to push something through the pipe.
- I saw another guy had something that looked like a meat poker in his hand.
- There was a really big crowd of people (about 30 to 40) where two of the women offered to sell me rock.
- I didn't feel safe in the area.
- There was so many people that I am not sure they could tell you what planet they were on.

## *Appendix C*

### **Interview Results from Student Two- First Walk Along**

- I was really intimidated by two girls a little younger than me, they were watching me and I was scared by them.
- I saw a person lifting their shirt and lighting something under their shirt.
- I saw several people tweaking, checking the ground.
- I saw several people scrunching down and facing the other way doing drugs.
- I saw some people with a plastic pipe doing drugs.
- I saw some regular-looking couples.
- Someone said something to me in Spanish.
- Someone offered me "Up."
- I heard someone else say, "The price of up these days is way out of here."
- I saw three guys dancing around weird like they were half falling down and half dancing.
- As I got closer to the police station it seemed calmer.
- I saw lots of people doing drugs.
- I was scared because of the number of people doing drugs.
- I saw one girl behind a dumpster doing drugs.
- The girls are very intimidating.
- At a crosswalk where three regular-looking guys and these two guys came up beside me and I thought something was going to happen.

## *Appendix D*

### **Interview Results from Student Three- First Walk Along**

- I started on the north side of the street, I saw two exchanges of hands. Three to four “tweakers” on that side of the street.
- I saw a guy come out of the bar yelling and swearing at another guy.
- On the way back I saw two people in a group of four exchanging something.
- When I got into the big crowd people started to whistle. I saw three four or five people doing that dance.
- I saw a guy with a crack pipe.
- I saw a guy asking if anyone wanted to buy a pipe. I saw two or three Hispanic male approach a pickup, saw the Hispanic stick his hand in and then the truck left.
- I was then up to Main Street.
- I saw a lot of people drunk coming out of the bars, using foul language, strong smell of urine on the street.
- My general impression of uncleanness.
- A sense of despair from the people down there.

## *Appendix E*

### **Interview Results from Student Four- First Walk Along**

- The north side was quite a bit different from the south side.
- I saw three or four people smoking a joint.
- One guys asked me if I wanted to smoke valium.
- Some people appeared to be drunk or stoned.
- The further I walked down the road the less it seemed to be crazy.
- I saw a black guy approaching a guy and appear to make a deal.
- I saw huge groups of people, easily 25 to 30 people all congregated.
- Going through there was like a shopping mall. There were several offers to purchase within this group.
- I saw two people in the alley.
- I saw another large group of people, smelled lots of pot.
- More offers to purchase valium.
- It was hard to catch everything that was going on because there was so much.

## *Appendix F*

### **Interview Results from Student Five- First Walk Along**

- It was pretty quiet.
- There was people congregating together.
- People selling stuff on the sidewalk (not drugs).
- Garbage and urine everywhere.
- I was approached three times by people to purchase drugs.
- I saw a guy carrying a TV around.
- I saw lots of people using drugs.
- I saw three drug transactions.
- I was walking down the south side and there were about 7 people there. I saw a prisoner wagon and three police cars and 10 officers standing around and the crowd was thinned out and dispersed.
- When I came back the police were gone and the crowd was forming again.
- A police car then did a traffic stop.
- I saw a few people sitting at the Carnegie Centre.
- When the police were there people all left.
- It seemed quiet from when I have been down there before I think it because the police were there.
- I saw lots of Latino men and very few women (10 to 15).

## *Appendix G*

### **Interview Results from Student Five- Second Walk Along**

- I first started outside beside the Main Hastings a guy was yelling out if anyone wanted to buy smokes, a motorcycle officer had pulled him over within a minute and began to write him a ticket.
- I saw at the Four Corners Savings I saw four people sleeping.
- A guy in a wheelchair almost got hit by a car and he began to yell obscenities.
- I saw some officers detaining three males, two of the males were in handcuffs.
- I saw some guys selling some stuff on the sidewalk. I saw that they had some marijuana they were dumping into a baggie.
- A Spanish guy walked up to me and asked me if I wanted to buy some rock.
- I saw quite a few police officers, I saw 6 or 7 officers on the Main Street.
- I did see about 30 people hanging around in Pigeon Park.
- The street seemed a lot less crazy this time than last. There was way less people just hanging around. There were not the mobs of people that I had to walk through.
- There seemed to be a lot less Hispanic guys.
- There was about 12 people outside Carnegie. One guy was yelling and he had a syringe in his hand.

## *Appendix H*

### **Interview Results from Student Two- Second Walk Along**

- It was actually a pleasant walk, it looked cleaner, I wasn't intimidated.
- I saw tons of police officers, almost two at each corner.
- I walked by a pub and a police officer was dealing with a woman who was crying.
- I noticed lots of police cars.
- Police officers talking to normal looking people.
- It was nice.
- A guy said to me do you want to buy something.
- One person actually said hello and was that very nice.
- A girl was sitting in front of a pizza joint swore at me when I looked at her, then I remembered we were not to look directly at people, I clicked that.
- It just looked much cleaner.
- There was not as many groups of people.
- I saw one girl who looked really sick was yelling where is everybody.
- I was offered drugs once, I did not see anyone doing drugs, I did see people giving others what appeared to be drugs, I am not sure if it was drug use but it was not visible like last time.
- I saw one person tweaking.

## *Appendix I*

### **Interview Results from Student One- Second Walk Along**

- There seemed to be nobody on the street.
- It was a completely different street.
- Nobody talked to me, nobody approached me. I tried to walk as slow as I could.
- There was so much more room to walk, the streets were so crowded last time. I wasn't worried about bumping into anybody this time.
- I saw a girl wiggling out, she appeared to be trying to chew her lips off.
- I was way more relaxed, there was so many police.
- On the street I saw way more police. The last time I think I only saw one car. This time I saw at least 8 to ten on foot. At one corner there was four officers.
- Last time I was afraid around that big crowd this time there were no groups on the street.

## *Appendix J*

### **Interview Results from Student Four- Second Walk Along**

- A prostitute approached me and asked me if I wanted to use her cell phone, and then she asked me if there was anything else she could do for me.
- There were five Aboriginal ladies in a lane drinking beer.
- I saw drinking which I did not see last time.
- I saw a lady in a wheelchair getting helped across the street by another guy.
- I saw police horses.
- I was at Abbott Street, I saw five black guys and I saw two officers across the street, when the officers started to approach them they all split up and went in different directions.
- I saw another guy and a girl walk up the street and meet two other guys. They passed something and then split up.
- There were some tweakers out as well.
- I saw one lady shooting up in Pigeon Park.
- The crowds were definitely not like last time, not even close, not even close.
- People on the street seemed to be more aware and on edge.
- I felt a lot safer, partially because it was daylight and also because of the number of cops, they seemed to be everywhere.
- There was another guy on drugs on the sidewalk trying to get up.
- It seemed to be a lot more alcohol this time, but that might be because I was just able to see more because the crowd were so much smaller.
- The street seemed regular, even the people who seemed drunk did not really cause a stink.

## *Appendix K*

### **Interview Results from Student Three- Second Walk Along**

- There were a lot less people. A lot less street people.
- I did notice that there were actual normal people out.
- I actually saw some joggers going down the street.
- There wasn't the overpowering smell of urine this time.
- Still some garbage and broken windows.
- The police presence there were police everywhere you looked, in the alleys, up the streets.
- Lots of the officers were talking to the street people.
- I saw less activity, last time there were more vehicles pulling up to the people on the street and then buying and driving away. I did not see any of this this time. There were couples walking around not like last time.
- I was not approached for drugs.
- I saw one drug transaction.
- I saw another guy holding a needle in his hand.
- There was another guy starting to get ready in a stairwell.
- Two people that were tweakers.
- I felt a lot more comfortable, last time the big groups of people were scary. This time there was nothing bigger than five people and I did not have any concerns for my safety.
- I saw lots of police cars parked, and cops on foot and motorcycles.

*Appendix L*

Student One Comparison Comments

First Walk	Second Walk
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Two or three guys on the right side of the street, and one of the guys approached me in a manner to try and grab me.</li><li>• I didn't feel safe in the area.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• There seemed to be nobody on the street</li><li>• It was a completely different street</li><li>• Nobody talked to me, nobody approached me. I tried to walk as slow as I could</li><li>• There was so much more room to walk, the streets were so crowded last time. I wasn't worried about bumping into anybody this time.</li><li>• I was way more relaxed; there was so many police.</li><li>• On the street I saw way more police. The last time I think I only saw one car. This time I saw at least 8 to ten on foot. At one corner there was four officers.</li><li>• Last time I was afraid around that big crowd this time there were no groups on the street</li></ul>

Student Two Comparison Comments

First Walk	Second Walk
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I was really intimidated by two girls a littler younger than me, they were watching me and I was scared by them.</li> <li>• I saw lots of people doing drugs</li> <li>• I was scared because of the number of people doing drugs</li> <li>• I saw one girl behind a dumpster doing drugs</li> <li>• The girls are very intimidating</li> <li>• At a crosswalk where three regular looking guys and these two guys came up beside me and I thought something was going to happen.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It was actually a pleasant walk, it looked cleaner, I wasn't intimidated</li> <li>• I saw tons of police officers, almost two at each corner</li> <li>• I noticed lots of police cars</li> <li>• Police officers talking to normal looking people</li> <li>• It was nice</li> <li>• It just looked much cleaner</li> <li>• There was not as many groups of people</li> <li>• I was offered drugs once, I did not see anyone doing drugs, I did see people giving others what appeared to be drugs, I am not sure if it was drug use but it was not visible like last time</li> </ul>
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### Student Three Comparison Comments

First Walk	Second Walk
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I started on the north side of the street, I saw two exchanges of hands.</li> <li>• Three to four "tweakers" on that side of the street</li> <li>• I saw a guy come out of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There were a lot less people. A lot less street people</li> <li>• I did notice that there were actual normal people out.</li> <li>• I actually saw some joggers going down the street</li> <li>• The police presence there were police everywhere you looked, in the alleys, up the streets.</li> <li>• Lot of the officers were talking to the street people.</li> </ul>

<p>the bar yelling and swearing at another guy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• On the way back I saw two people in a group of four exchanging something.</li> <li>• When I got into the big crowd people started to whistle</li> <li>• I saw three four or five people doing that dance</li> <li>• I saw a guy with a crack pipe</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I saw less activity, last time there were more vehicles pulling up to the people on the street and then buying and driving away. I did not see any of this time.</li> <li>• There were couples walking around not like last time.</li> <li>• I was not approached for drugs</li> <li>• I felt a lot more comfortable, last time the big groups of people were scary. This time there was nothing bigger than five people and I did not have any concerns for my safety.</li> <li>• I saw lots of police cars parked, and cops on foot and motorcycles.</li> </ul>
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### Student Four Comparison Comments

First Walk	Second Walk
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The further I walked down the road the less it seemed to be crazy.</li> <li>• I saw a black guy approaching a guy and appear to make a deal</li> <li>• I saw huge groups of people easily 25 to 30 people all congregated.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There were five Aboriginal ladies in a lane drinking beer</li> <li>• I saw drinking which I did not see last time.</li> <li>• The crowds were definitely not like last time, not even close, not even close.</li> <li>• People on the street seemed to be more aware and</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Going through there was like a shopping mall. There were several offers to purchase within this group</li> <li>• It was hard to catch everything that was going on because there was so much</li> </ul>	<p>on edge.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I felt a lot safer, partially because it was daylight and also because of the number of cops, they seemed to be everywhere.</li> <li>• It seemed to be a lot more alcohol this time, but that might be because I was just able to see more because the crowd were so much smaller.</li> <li>• The street seemed regular, even the people who seemed drunk did not really cause a stink</li> </ul>
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### Student Five Comparison Comments

First Walk	Second Walk
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It was pretty quiet</li> <li>• There was people congregating together</li> <li>• People selling stuff on the sidewalk (not drugs)</li> <li>• Garbage and urine everywhere</li> <li>• I was approached three times by people to purchase drugs</li> <li>• I saw lots of people using drugs</li> <li>• I saw three drug transactions</li> <li>• I was walking down the south side and there were about 7 people there. I saw a prisoner wagon and three police cars and 10 officers standing around and the crowd was thinned out and dispersed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I first started outside beside the Main Hastings a guy was yelling out if anyone wanted to buy smokes, a motorcycle officer had pulled him over within a minute and began to write him a ticket</li> <li>• I saw at the 4 corners Savings I saw four people sleeping</li> <li>• I saw quite a few police officers, I saw 6 or 7 officers on the Main Street.</li> <li>• I did see about 30 people hanging around in Pigeon Park</li> <li>• The street seemed a lot less crazy this time than last. There was way less</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• When I came back the police were gone and the crowd was forming again.</li><li>• When the police were there people all left.</li><li>• It seemed quiet from when I have been down there before I think it because the police were there.</li></ul>	<p>people just hanging around. There were not the mobs of people that I had to walk through.</p>
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# APPENDIX M

## The Downtown Eastside



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
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
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
*Appendix O*

Area Surrounding DTES



Detailed Downtown Eastside





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